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PREFACE 
iC<liCMICS 01 DEFESSI PRCCUREMENT 
AND SMALL BUSINESS 
Since the end o! World War II and partioularq aince the Korean 
incident, military procurement has achieved a peacetime volume never 
before contemplated in our history. This high level ot activity and the 
likelihood that it will continue tor a long time gives def'ense spending 
a nev importance in the national econ0Jll7• It is therefore desirable 
t.hat small business should seek participation in this new and large 
opportunit71 since it alwqs has been in competition to serve other 
kinds of' economic demands. 
!h1a thesis will examine the magnitude and nature of militacy 
procurement and the special commercial considerations involved. !be 
analysis will concentrate on specialised mili tar;r equipnent and will 
give on}T passing attention to the problems of doing business with the 
military in such CQ'mloditiea ea shoes, clothing, t.Jpewriters, meat and 
vegetable products, .t'Umiture, and a multitude or other items the 
services buy that are similar to or identical with standard articles of 
camnerce. 
The main concem ot thia atud,y• therefore, will center on the 
method ot procurement of weapons and the related and specialized 
equipaent essential to their operation. It will• of necesaity, include 
components, materials, special products, and aemces required tor 
weapons and their directl.7 related equip.uenta. 
Thia leads to consideration ot the 11eapona S.YStem concept ot 
proo.urement management which has grown up in the last five yeera. 
Although t.he emphasis will be on the procurement of weapons, it is also 
essential to take into account the national securi tq consideration 
which canpela a distinction between the market tor these goods and that 
which prevails in nOl"S'Bal cc:rmnercial contracts. 
Special contract and legal considerations will not be included 
here. Instead, this thesis will deal only with the econcmic and 
IU\tiont\l security considerations and will not treat with either the 
legal or ~oral issues 1nvol'98d. 
It is the expressed intent ot Congress, the President, end the 
Secrat&J7 of De.tense that small business firms should receive a greater 
a.ltare of govfil'mllent procurement dollars. They have repeatedl.y expressed 
their belief that there exist.a in this countey a constant need tor 
emphasis on th• importance or smell business-first, in the over-all 
econanyJ eecond, in the over-all defense ei'tartJ third, in aped.fie areas 
ot the defense eftortJ and, tourtb, 1n the pattern ot indust.17 as a whole. 
Large business hall long recognized the value ot small business in their 
production program, and. over-all operation.1 make-up, and particularl.7 
in the sreas or costs, quality, 1ngenu1t.;y, anc:l dependability. Congress 
and the President have both stated that they also recognize these 
qualities cf amall buaine~us and that thq are endeavoring to keep end 
increase quali!ied small business firms 1n the Oovernment•s procure-
ment program by affording small business a more equitable opportunity 
to compete tor the supplies and services bought dail.1' by the Government. 
Section 2(a) of Fu.blio Law 5361 Small Buoinesa Act titled, 
et.Polley ol Congroaa" atatoa in part as foll<TwS: 
the essence of the American economic system ot private 
enterprise is free canpetition. 0n17 tbrout;h Ml and tree 
caupetition can free markets, tree entry into busineas, and 
opportunities for the expresaion and growth of personal 
initiative and individual judpent be assured. The preserva-
tion and expsnaion of such compet.1 tion ia basic not only to 
the cconcmic well-being but to the aecuriv ot this Nation. 
®ch accuri"tvr and well-being cannot be realized unleos the 
actual and potential capacity ot s;ull buainess ia encouraged 
and developed. lt is the declared policy cf the Conaress 
that the Government ehould aid, cmnael, aaeiat, end. protect, 
insofar as ia possible, the interests of e:mall business con-
cerns in order to preserve .free canpetitive enterprise, to 
insure that a f'air proportion 0£ the total purchases and 
contracts or aui:>contracta £or proport\f and services !or the 
Ooverment (including but not limited to contracts or subcon-
tracts f'or maintenance, repair, and construction) be placed 
with small business enterprises ••• 
On Februar7 6, 1961, the President eent a one paragraph memorandum 
to the Secretary ot Defense which reads as follows: 
I note that. Congress has once again criticized the Depart-
ment o£ Defense tor not giving more contracts to am.all buainess. 
Thia 1a an old complaint. I think it would be useful for 70u 
to have. SOll$0U8 look into exactly bov this ia handled end 
whether i~ 1s pos!iible tor the D.,;tense Depert.ment to put more 
emphasis on small business. It it isn't possible tor us to do 
better than baa been done in th• past I think w aheuld know about 
it. It it ia possible tor us to do better we should go ahead 
with it and I think we should make aane public mtatetlcnts on it. 
Would you let me know about this? 
Secretaq McNamara answered the President on March 14, 19611 as 
£o1lont 
The Secretaries ot the Military Departments have been in-
structed b.Y the Deputy SecretUT ot De.tense to take steps to 
assure increased awards of pr.I.me contracts to small business 
tirma immediatel.T. 
SpecUicall.71 the Mili tar,y Departments have been asked to 
set a goal, increasing individu.all.T, in Fiscal Year 1963 small 
business participati.oo by ten per cent over the figures for 
Fi8¢al Iear 1960. Total small buainesa participation in Depert-
unt ot .De.f'enae prlme contracting in F18cal Year 1960 amounted 
to f3 .440 billion, or sixteen and one-tenth per cent ct the 
cnerall total of all contract awards. 
In addition, actions to increase over fiscal fear 1960 
figures anall business participation in research and develop-
ment contract. are called tor. During that year this category 
or contracting accuunted for only one hundred eighty million 
dollara, or three and £our-tenths per cent of the total. 
Immediate improvement ot the small business picture ia 
called tor in the second half of the current fiscal year. 
During the £irat halt ot the year &1.337 billion, er fifteen 
and £ive-tentha per cent of total pril4e contract.1.ng went to 
em.all businesses. 
Deput7 Secretary ot Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric pointed 
out that a review of the Department•a eull business policies 
indicates they are sutticientlybrosd to allow additional 
award.a to small buaineee ti.nu, but it the need should arise 
!or revised policies or. procedures, such revisions 'Will be 
incorporated in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation. 
On April 25, 19611 testimcey vu given b7 the Secretar.r or Defense 
at a bearing held b7 the Government Procurement SUbcamnittee of the Senate 
Small Business Committee. A resume of this statement 1a as tollowas 
'1'he Department of Detenoe ia determined to devote more 
attention to the small business program than it has previous)Jr 
received, and to raise the percentage o.t de.tense contract 
dollars awarded to small i'irma. 
Department of Defense statistics reveal that the decline 
in percentage awarded to small business directl;y correlates 
with. the increased. percentage of resources being spent tor 
JUjor weapons SJ'&tema. 'l'he emphasis on mej or weapons systems 
is expe.oted. to continue.· From l9S6 to 1960 the money apent 
on missile systems rose .f'rom one billion dollars to five 
billion dollars. In the missile field. only .four to five per 
centvae awarded to 81'4all business and not much improvement 
can be expected at the prime contract. level. 
Department of Defense 'believes tbe downward trend can be 
reversed. b.Y giving more attention to ave.rding prime contracts 
to small firms for goods and services other than major vespons. 
The overall Department ot Defense goal is a ten per cent 
increase during Fiscal Year 1962 over the percentage ot small 
business awards made during Fiscal Year 1960. Quotas are 
being assigned to f!llf!r:f J.rrrr:r Technical Service, Rav Bureau, 
and Air Force Command, with a further breakdown ot quotas 
beine made to individual installations, activities, and baaes. 
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CHAPTER I 
----
The national annual volume ct bus1neae hae expanded tour.told 
since l9bO. During thia smne period, national security expenditures 
have expended at a much more rapid rate. From a level of one hundred 
billion dollars in 1940, the gross national product has grown to tive 
hundred .fitt1•four billion dollars in 1962. During this same period, 
national. securitJ' apenditurea 11hich amounted to only two billion dollars 
in 1940 had grown to tittyr•tbree billion dollars in 1962, or more then 
2$ times the 1940 level. The annual changes in gross national product 
and in national securit7 expenditures over this O year period are shown 
in table I on page 2 and more strik1ng13 portrayed in Chart I on page 3. 
lat.1onal securiv expenditures today represent a greater economic 
force than sey other single major activity. This spending which accounts 
tor .fif'_.•nine and three-tenths per cent of the Government•e entire budget 
expenditures and consumes more than nine per cent of our gross national 
product hes becaue a highly a1gnif1cant determinant 1n the functioning or 
the econom.y. From 19.$0 to 1962 while the nation's volume or business ex-
panded 61.$%, Department or Defense expmded 2$8.~. OnlT residential 
houaing and public constru.ct.1on even approach in economic sigaificance 
the m11\tar7 total. As a consequence of this magnitude ot business, it 
ls veey important to see vhat effect this has on the amall business 
canmun1ty. 
TABLE I 
---
GROOS N.ATiaiAL PRODUCT AHD IL\TICSAL SECURifI EXP'lNDITUR!S 
19b0-1962 
Year 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
191'4 
194$ 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
l9SO 
19Sl 
19.$2 
19.$3 
1954 
19SS 
19S6 
19S7 
1958 
l9S9 
1960 
1961 
1962 
(Billi.ems ot Dollars) 
Gross 
Uational Product 
lational Security 
Expenditures 
2 
SOORCih United States Department ot Comerce, Sune7 of Current Busi-
ness, July 19>7, page 9J febl"UB17 19581 page BJ August, 1960, 
page 7J and F.Wl"WU7 1963, page S. 
CH.ART I 
---
Groaa lat10Tlal Product, 
and 
Bational Securiq ixt>enditures (Unadjusted)• 
1940-1962 
Billions of Dollars 
6o0.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---, 
500. 
hOO -
200 -
100 .. 
90-
eo. 
l8: 50. 
LO• 
30-
20. 
3-
2-
SClJRCBt 
u. s. Department ot Ccmierce 
SUrv87 of Current Businen, 
Jul.T l9S7. February 19$8, 
August 1960, and J'ebl"Ua17 
1963. 
l.O t tt t1\t1tttttttt1tttttt1 
1938 ho 42 44 h6 h8 SO !R 54 S6 SS 60 62 
*In order to ccmrpare the rates of change, the data 
are presented· on a aemilogeri thm1c or ratio scale. 
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CHAPl'ER II 
............. --. -
DOINO BUSINESS WITH TtlE MILITARY 
Although a1; .first glance it might seem that doing business 
with the milltarr would be no different from commercial trarusactiona 
with other cuatcnera, closer scrutin.y will indicate some highly 
specialized conditions which make considerations o.t aucceas or 
.tailure quite different in the mill tary muket !rcn those in normal 
trade. These involve, for example, the kinda o.t goods and speciti-
cationa for them required by the services, the multiple decision 
processes involved in placing orders, and the violent fluctuations 
in total volume resulting from changes in the thinking of the 
President or the C~-ress regarding the level o! apenditures. that 
should be permitted in aupporfi of the armed forces. 
IDIDS OP' GOODS AND SPECIFICATIONS RE<Ct!!Rl?J) 
BI THE HILITARI 
Knowing what the mill teI',Y wants uauall;y involves more than 
just contacting the blJ1'ers and looking at periodically published 
lists or contracts to be let. In order to be equal to or ahead of 
our potential enemies, the m1l1t417 demands continually press against 
the outer perimeter 0£ both the current and the expected atate-ot ... tbe-art 
made possible by science and technology. 'lhe growth in importance and 
cost of research and developnent in recent years has meant that very rev 
s 
cmpanies can themselves undertake the financial risks involved rmct, as 
a result, tbat most of the research and development is financed by the 
Uovernment. 
Al.though there 1s a tendency to think or such machine marvels 
as color television and automatic gear shifts as new, if ve stop and 
tbink £or a moment we will note that twenty ,-ears or aore elapsed between 
the first projection of these ideas and. their introdUction on the 
co.lm'.erciel market. The millt&rJ" cannot wait t.wenty years tor the 
performance reliability and reasonable cost which are more or less 
normal in the comercia.l realm. ll'.ven though the businessman muat think 
ct the possibill t.y of a compet1 tor getting the jump on him, he does not 
have to think of the devutating and horrii.'ying results or e.n error in 
deciaiou which confront tile Joint Chiera of Stat! WJ.'len they are tor the 
tirst time presented vitil t.'le eoienti!ic possibility ot creating a 
revolut1ona.J7 new weapon. Althcugr. there &re conditionn under which 
trJ.e nev capability can be achieved ju:st a few steps beyond the mating 
state•o!•the-art, in l'lOSt cases, the projection means moving in a rev 
years to a point to which normal coro.mercial evolution would have brought 
us in 'twenty or more ~ears. 
Partly because of the ver;; advanced ideas., tut to a larger 
extent because ot the nature or the legal and administrative procedures 
established by the Government and th• military, selling to the armed 
services is not a simple and atrait:btforward task. Tho military cannot 
6 
know the quantity ot an it.ea it wants until it haa reasonable assurance 
ot its performance. Since the capability ie baaed upon the realization 
ot an aa yet unestablished state-of-the art, no one can know how good 
or worthwhile the proposal is until after an extensive test program. 
Under these c1rcumatances1 decisions to buy are a mixture of optimism, 
knowledge, and willinbness to take numerous types of risks. As research 
and development becomes more and more expansive, coat considerations 
have became ir.ereuingly important. In any event, it is not easy to get 
a yes-or-no decision with respect to either the item or its quantity. 
Ml!IlllP.LE DECISlet~ PROCESSES IMVOLVED 
.Bi!'ORE Rii:cUVING PllRCHAS!'J onD.iiRS 1ROM THE MILITAnt 
M1Utary requirements for an item will be changed continuously, 
as hopes are tempered by experience. Qlant.itiea will go up and down as 
the pragmatic estimate of the value of the .final product changes. This 
process would make life commerc1all1' d1t£icult even 11' it occurred at 
onlJ' one point. However, in the case or the militar,r, this process takes 
place in at least £our or five places, and often more. 
For example, decisions affecting the eventual procurement of 
military equipment may be .first drawn up and reviewed at one or more 
levels in the using command, bUrcau, or corps. Decisions thus made are 
referred first to the military stet•r or the appropriate headquarters in 
Washington and then to the Departmental Se.cretary•s office. Those that 
eurvive are referred to the Department ot Defense, and, if approved there, 
7 
to the Bureau of the Budget. It is apparent that this process 'Will 
ordinariiy require numerous interactions emong the o.f'ficea and agencies 
concerned, with resulting de]Jqs and extensive time lags, and that the 
!'inal procurement decision will oi'ten bear little resemblance to the 
orig:Lnal proposal. 
THB lNCIWSE IN 'l'liE RELATIVE IMPORTA.lllCE 
OF IllSE.AROif AUD Dh-VELO!mNT IN MILITARY .PROCUREMENT 
Against this multiplicity ot militar,y decieion-making points, 
one can !ormulate his own estimate of the cost ot representation and 
presentation which must be bome by the vendor in his search tor mill t817 
equipment business. \'fben this is coupled vi th the other financial 
considerations involved and the necessity !or having the mechanical and 
human capabilit1ea t.o perform the job, it. becomes apparent that substan-
tial reaaurcea are required to do business with the armed services. 
Same measure of the magnitudes involved end part.ic:ularly the changes 
111hich have occurred in recent years mq be obtained by considering the 
changes in relative importance or research and development and procurement 
outlays !or major weapons. Research and development coats tor most 
types ot World War ll aircraft were ordinarily measured in hundreds ot 
thousands or hlmdreds ot millions of dollars vi tb .follow.on procurement 
outlaya in tens or hundreds of millions. Research, development, and 
test on equipment such as the B-S2 rm into millions, tollowed by 
procurement costs of billions. For the ballistic minile program, 
8 
developnent oosta (including test) are measured in billions and (depend-
ing on c;Uantities of operational mlssiles procured) may even approach 
tbe ultimate procurG11ent outlaya. 
Under present institutional arrangements. the real payoff to 
the vendor ter..ds to occur only if the research and developn.ent effort 
can be converted into a procurement contra.ct £or the finished article. 
Three thinga are especially notewortbyt (1) the eize or the research 
and development e££ort. is, ot iteself, largeJ (2) the volume ot pro-
curement is so large as to require very substantial resources; and 
(3) the growth in research and develop11ent, together with the decline in 
the relative importance of procurement, makes the tin&ncial ability to 
enter into research and development a matter of prime iraportance. 
The increase in the relative importance or the cost of research 
and development is impressive and overwhelming from a commercial point 
of view. Although unclassified data on reeee.rcb and develapnent costs 
!or individual weapons currently under development are not available, 
the Patman Committee published a llstl ot the canpanies and institutions 
recei'Ving the largest amounts of militar,y research and development 
contracts in fiscal year 19$6-1958. Table II on page 9 allows these data 
tar major conpanies lihose bulliness is primari~ militB.171 t0gether with 
laouse Select Committee on Small Business, t1nal report, House of 
Representatives Report. Number 29101 84th Oaigreea, Seoond Session 171-73 (1959). 
TABLE II 
---
~COMPANIES WITH LARGE HtOPatTialS OF MILI'l!RY BUSINESS 
MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COOTRACTS AND BET WORTH 
(Millions 0£ Dollars) 
North .American Aviation 
Boeing Airplane CCBriJ>8D7 
General ll1namica 
Martin Ccmp&'flT 
Bell Aircratt, Corporation 
Aerojot General 
Northrop Aircraft, Ina. 
Curtiss-Wright Corporation 
Lockheed Aircratt Corporation 
Spe1'17·Rand Corporation 
Raytheon lWlutacturing Caapany 
United Aircra.tt Corporation 
Douglu Aircraft Compa.D1' 1 Inc• 
Bendix Aviation Corporation 
McDonnell Aircratt Corporation 
Chance Vought Aircraft 
Republic Aviation Corporation 
Fairchild lnpne end Airplane Corp. 
Thiokol Corporation 
Ryan Aeronautical 
Mill tat7 Research and 
Development Contracts 
Fiscal Ieare 19S6-19SB 
1421 
212 
169 
U6 
U4 
115 
105 
93 
84 
83 
71 
67 
39 
34 
32 
32 
30 
2S 
21 
17 
Net 
Worth 
l9S8 
$1.Sl 
lh9 
143 
64 
39 
16 
28 
18) 
107 
2Sb 
hJ 
219 
153 
177 
28 
29 
46 
37 
6 
11 
SOURCES 1 Research and Development contract totals tram. House Select 
Connittee on SSall Business, li'inlll Report, (House ot Repre-
aentativea Report thunber) 29701 lightg-tou.rth Congress, 
Second Session (19$9) J lfet Worth tran ffoodz' a Manuals ,!?! 
Investments. 
Parent corporations and subsidiaries are not consolidated in all cases. 
10 
the companies• net worth in 19.58. The magnitude or the research and 
development figures indicates that in ma117 cases, the efi'ort would be 
beyond the capability ot a small ti.rm and that in others, it they- were, 
indeed, undertaken and proved unsucceaa.t:u.1, tb.e result would be financial 
catastrophe. 
There mq be some who will experience a .teeling ot diamq toward 
theae high costs of research and development. especially when they 't!IBY 
tend to drive smaller concerns out o! the market ss prime contractors. 
It should be recognized, however, that unlike production, where timing 
and volume can be calculated fairly well in advance, research and develop-
ment is very often an attempt to exploit a chain of reasoning which rests 
in part on proved scientific principles, 1n part on pl.8usib1e hypotheses, 
and in part on intuition or informed opinion on the part ot specialists. 
Added to this usual~ are requirements for :retention or high strength 
of materials under increasingly' high temperatur•, 1'1r1er and finer 
tolerances of tit, and the highest attainable level ot reliability. 
The combination ot all these means, in economic terma, the need to build 
and. statt highl.1 specialized laboratories and to support them tor periods 
ot unpredictable length, while a high-priced scientific and engineering 
stat£, supported by skilled craftsmen, run down one promising lead after 
another. There is very little that is predictable in thia process. 
There is no way ot guaranteeing results. 
ADVANTAGES ACCRUING TO THE DUSINFSSM.All 
YRCJi DEl'EMSE CO?,TRACTDtG 
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The e.ttect ot a militar;y procurement contract on the contractor's 
statua varies wideq. In the main there accrue several benefits to the 
contractor !rem de!onse contracting on a reasonably sustained basis. 
These benefits '!fl8¥ includes 
.Profits. Within the framework of present types ot de.fense 
contracts and renegotiation procedures, a contractor is expected to 
make a reasonable profit on the gocda and services supplied. This is 
the basic benefit ot contracting. 
Reduced overhead. The pt:rf ormance or defense contracts ll&Y 
permit continuoue use or prodUction rao1Ut1es otherwise idle, minimizing 
possible slack aeaaons or reduced business activity. This Jll81" serve to 
lo111"'er overhead expenses, reducing unit costs ot geode for the civilian 
aa well as for tbe m.ilitar1 market. Indireetl.T, therefore, such 
contracts can serve to increase profits on civilian goods in coxnparison 
with competitors. 
Personnel. Uninterrupted production, uaieta\ by defense procure-
ment contracts, assures the continuit7 to attract ad1.dnistrat1ve1 
technical and production personnel. The aize and respons1b11itiea of the 
related operations can be a power.1'11 attraction to qual1fied personnel. 
Techno1op:. Since much o! mill tary hardware is of higbq canplex 
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types, specialized techniques ere required in performance of procurement 
contracts. Whether worked out by the producer himaelf or in cooperation 
with the tlil1tar1 authoritieo, this lmow-how can be highly valuable tor 
production or ailllilar good.I tor the civilian economy-. Particularly in 
the now or improved civilian products which are the probable outgrowth 
ot mill tarJ technology advances, this bead start m1iJ' be one of the 
greatest eour'Ces ot pro.fit .f'rau the contract. 
Defense procuremat.'a impact not on17 is apparent within a parti-
cular industry, but it mq also reorient industry lines. Major companies 
in on• industrr obtain contracts tor production of a basic 1 tem w1 thin 
that industr;r 1 embod,ying auxiliar.Y equipment normall.7 produced by other 
industries. Acquiaition of the technolog in the new field may lead 
the company toward nn lines. Aircraft manufacturers, for example, in 
shifting to missile buoiness, have developed capabilities in electronics 
that mB1' make them significant .factors in that field. 
this p;rticulsrl.y ee~'\13 a result of weapons system procurement, 
giving broad responsibility tor development, deaic;n• and production of 
a •"hole complex weapon to one compan.y. Such a co:npafl1' will, of course, 
widely subcontract =u.ch or the t.'Ork on component parts. However. 
tbot:gh mitigated. b; milltar,y supervision, "make or buy" decisions may 
make poi:Jsi'blc the inve.aion of new industrial tields b.Y af'!'ording 
opportunity £or tho production of profitable components under the 
contraotor•a cwn roe!. 
DlSADVAIUGES OF Dt:i'DSE OCtiTRACTING 
TO THE .BUSIIESSMAB 
1J 
'lo balance t.hia picture, however, it. ahculd be recognised that 
to acne the bene.fita ot defense contracting are out"1.ghed b7 disadvan-
tage1. Tb.ere are companiea which •bJ' awq from this business altogether, 
and others, after b&adllng it ror a period., are discouraged .from seeking 
future defense work. Some find that the precontract expenses incident 
to preparing bids or proposals, often running into thousande of dollars, 
are more than thtq cen prudent17 upend upon tbe mere contingenq of 
get.ting a contract. other compau1.ea believe that renegotiation pro-
cedUres, after completion or the contract, deprive them of profits to 
the extent or1ginalls contemplated. Still others state that the 
complexities of handling defense business - admjnistrative redtape, 
changes in apec1£1ca.tions1 and inspect.ion procedures •• tend to eat up 
a disproportionate share ot the profit. Again• since ao m.an.y items 1n 
de.tense procurement an nonstandard, the necese1:lt1 tor eatablleb.ing 
individualized production lines mq involve greater expense and t.ime-
con81ll11ng trouble than would appear warranted bJ the profits reasonabl.T 
expected. In production of acme items presentl.T unrelated to canme:rcial 
markets, the profit anticipation UT be auU. 
The increasing possibility thet nev technological devolepment 
will out.mode complex new products bet'ore production hats begun lenda 
further uncertainty. Thus, acme of the lat.eat weapons will be required 
onl7 in exper1aenta.l quant1tiea, and almost custom-produeed. There 
will be n.O opportunit7 !or assetnbly·line production in volume before 
never replace:r.ents are devised, and production et.f'icienc1 and maximum 
pro.fits depend upon volume output. Accord1ng17, though it is infrequent, 
t.he milltar.1 aenices mq have to seek out tinns to produce a particular 
item. 
thuei, defense contracts VarJ' widely in ratea ot retum \o the 
ncipient, a!2d con1equ.ently in impact. .Both direct and indirect 
benefits, whether tangible or intangible, are realised accordingly to 
the circwutancea surrounding each contract and the efficiency and 
ability or the contractor. 
VIOWT lLUCTOA'fiai:3 IN TOTAL VOLUME 
OF MILITARI SPtNDD1Q 
In addition to the types of problems involved 1n selling the 
mili tar.Y which have been discusaed above, there ia another and perhaps 
more potent condition arising from the nature of our annual budget-
malcing proceas. In times ~ criais, as in World War II and Korea, there 
ia a tendency !or Congress and the Executive to make high sums of money 
available to the milita17. t.11en the crisis 1a over, there is a verr 
real desire to cut taxes and move towards balancing the budget, and, 
therefore, to cut back on lDil1taJ7 expenditures. The change in weapons 
procurement trm 1940-194$, as compared to 194S-l9SO, 1a striking. In 
tenus oi' what we can expect in the cold war, the changea that have 
occurred e1nce l9SO ere probab'q even more significant. (See Chart I 
on page .3.) 
lS 
from a canm•rcial point ot view, the important thing is the 
large volume of business and numbers of vendors that are brought in 
during the crisis expansion. 'When the cutback take• place, this 
naturally' hita no~ on}T the established veudors, but more perticularl7 
the new vendors wbo have just gotten etarted. This means then that the 
usual changes in executive and congressional policy with respect to 
upenditllres for m111tar.Y weapons produce a .feast-or-famine condition 
which makes ca:mneroial survival extremely difficult. 
1be sum or all these conditions means that it ie not eaq to 
do bueiness with the military. This ie reflected in the attitude ot 
the bankers and the investment fratern1t1 towards financing military 
vendors. Perhaps equallJ' noteworth1' ie the oft-repeated attitude of 
companies who can empl07 their resoarcea for non•miUtar.r purposes. 
After one or two aeasiona ot doing busineaa with the military acme will 
say •never again•. 
CHAPTER Ill 
-
aAOKGROOND M.ATElUAL CR ECONOOC ASPECTS 
From Ju13 11 1950 to .June 30, 1.962, the dollar value o£ the 
more than .f'OJ"V•two million mill taey procurement actions for vork in 
the United States totaled aw~ 1282 billion. Order placements have 
fluctuated trcm year to year aa ahow in Table llI 011 page 17. 
Ma?l1' congreaa1onal investigations have been made since 19Sl on 
various aspects or Department of Defense's procurement operations. 
During the past session of Congress aevere.1 committees of both Houses 
looked into di.f.t'e:rent aspects or the problems growing out of military" 
procurement. For example, a aubcanmittee of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee held utensiYe hearings on the following bills. 
Senate Bill Number soo. Introduced by Sena.tor Saltonstall, 
thie bill would amend title 101 United States Cede tor the purpose or 
removing obstacle• to improving the management of militaey weapon 
91stems procurement. 
Senate Bill Number 1383. Introduced by Senator Williama, this 
bill would re4dre the use ot competitive bidding to the greatest 
practical extent through tbe establishment b7 the Secretary ot De.tense 
ot apecitio standards govern.1ng the uee or negotiated contracts. 
TABLE m 
---
BT VA.WE1 Of MILITARI PROOUREMENT ACTICflS WITH BUSINESS FIRMS 
rm wcm m fJm UNIUD STATES 
fiscal Iear 
19Sl 
19$2 
1953 
19$4 
19S.$ 
19S6 
l9S7 
l9S8 
19$9 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Fiscal Iears 19Sl·l962 
Total If et Value 
(Millions) 
SWRCE1 Department ot Defense, Milita17 Prime Contract Awards to 
Small Business and Other Contractors, Jul.1"-December 1961, 
12 (1962) Supplemented for 1962. Small Business Adminia· 
tratica, ot:t'1ce of Procurement and 'lechnical Assistance, 
Wuhingtcrl1 D. c. March 1963. 
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luet. value ref era to the net change in the am.cunt of obligations 
resulting trcm debit and credit procurement actions recorded during the 
fiscal 1ear. Debit procurement actions are all new contracts plus con-
tract changea that increase the amount of obligations b7 ten thousand 
dollara or mort. Oredit procurement actions are contract modificaticna 
that decreue the aount or obligations b7 ten thousand dollars or more. 
18 
Senate Bill Number 1872• Introduced bT Senator Javits and 
Senator Keating, this would amend title 101 United States Code tor the 
purpose ot encouraging competition in the procurement b7 the armed 
eervicea. Among other things, this bill sets t'ortb a congressional 
declaration of poli07 to the etf eet that procuring agencies shall 
consider the strategic ffnd econanic desirabilitJ' of allocating purchases 
to di.ffereut geographic areas or the Maticn, and to elegible suppliers 
.f'rom whom relative)Jr smaller proportions of procurement have been made, 
as well as to small business and to labor surplus areas. 
These bills are still under consideration by the United States 
Senate. 
'?HE ARMi1l SERVICES PROOUREMENT ACT 
Advertising is historicalq the favored methcd of' government 
contracting. At one time it was virtuall.7 the onl;y legal wq ot enter-
ing into a government contract. The Armed Services Procurement Act of 
19h71 Public Law 413, Both Congress, liberalized the use ot negotiaticn 
by allowing the £ollOlling seventeen excepuona2t 
Section 2(c). .tll purchases and contracts for supplies 
and servicea shall be made by advertising, as provided in 
section 31 except that such purchases and contraets miq be 
negotiated by the agency" head without advertiaing it -
2circumatances Permitting Contracting by legotiation Under the 
Armed Services Procurement Act ot 1947, Public Law blJ 1 Both Congress. 
1. deter.nined to be neceasar,y- in the public interest during 
the period of a na\ional emergency declared by the President or 
b7 Congress. 
2. the public exigency will not admit of the delay incident 
to advertising. 
3. the aggregate amount involved does not exceed 
one thousand dollars (increased to $21500 by Public Law 8$-804). 
h. for personal or professional services. 
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S. tor my aervice to be rendered b7 8fl7 university, college, 
or other educational institution. 
6. the suppliers or servioea are to be proeured and uaed 
outside the lilllita of the United Statee and ita possessions. 
1. for snedic1nea or medical supplies. 
6. for supplies purchased tor author.l.zed resale. 
9. tor perishable subsistence auppliea. 
10. for supplies or aenices for which it ia impracticable 
to secure canpetition. 
11. the agency head determines thet the purchase or contract 
ia tor experimental, developuiental, or research work., or for the 
manu.tacture or furnishing of supplies tor experimentation, 
development, research, or teatt Provided, t.bat beginning six 
monthu after tbe effective . date 01· tiiia Act, and at the end ot 
eech six-month period thereaf'ter, there eha11 be furnished to 
the Congress a report setting forth the name ot each contractor 
with whom a contract has been entered into pursuant to this 
aubaction since the date ot tbe last such report, the emount 
of the contract, and, vi.th due conaideration given to the 
national securi1iy1 a description ot the work required to be 
perf omed thereunder. 
12. for supplies or services as to which the agency head 
determines that the character, ingredients,, or components thereof' 
are such that the purchase or contract should not be publicly 
disclosed.. 
1J. for equipment vhich the agency head determines to be 
technical equipment, and as to which he determines that the pro-
curemtr.11t thereof without advertising is neces1a17 in order to 
aasure standardization or equipnent and 1nterchaneeab111ty ot 
parts and that such standardization and interchangeability ie 
necesS417 in the public inte"at• 
14. tor supplies ot a technical or specialized nature 
requirtng a substantial ini:tial investment or an utended period 
ot preparation tor manuta.cture, as determined by tbe agency 
head, when be determines that advertising and competitive bid· 
ding wq require duplication of investment or preparation 
alreeey mad•• or will undUly delay procurement o£ such supplies. 
lS. tor supplies or servicea aa to which the agency head 
determines that the bid prices after advertising therefor are 
not reasonable or have not. been independently arrived at in 
open competition a Provided, that no negotiated purchase or 
contract mq be entered into under this paragraph alter the 
rejection of all bids nceived unless (a) notification of the 
intention to negotiate and reasonable opportunit7 t.o negotiate 
shall have been given b7 tne agency head to each responsible 
bidder, (b) tho negotiated price is lower then the lowest 
rejected bid price or a responsible bidder, as determined by the 
agency head, and (c) such negotiated price is the loweat 
neaotiated price of'.tered bf an;/ responsible supplier. 
16. the agency head determir.es that it is in the interest ot 
the national defense t.llat an;y plant, mine, or facility or any 
producer, manufacturer, or other supplier be made or kept avail· 
able for .turnishing supplies or services in the event of a 
national emergency, or that the interest either ot industrial 
lli0b111aation in case ot such an emergency, or or the national 
defense in maintaining active engineering, research, and develop-
ment.. are otherwise aubserveda Provided, that beginning six 
months after the e:t'fective date o? ttiis Act and at the end o£ 
each oix-montb period thereafter, there shall be !Umished to 
the Congreaa a report setting tortn the name of each contractor 
with wnom a contract. haa been entered into pursuant to this 
subsection (l.6) since the date of tba lut such report, the 
amount of the contract, and, with due consideration f;iven to 
the national aecuriv, a description ot the work l"eQUired to 
be pertormed tbereundet'J or 
17. otherwise authorized b7 lav. 
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GROONG US£ OF HEGOTIATIOO METHOD 
IN QOVF.RNMENT PROCUREMEN'l 
In enacting the Aftled Servicea Procurement A.ct, Congress 
incorporated a number or earlier statutory exceptions to formtollly 
adVertieed procurement and extended them uniformly to all three millttiey 
departments, the Coast Guard and the National Advisory Ccmm1ttee tor 
Aeronautioa (now National Aeronautics and Space Administration). these 
and other exceptions introduced tor the first time, it was believed, 
VOllld add procurement nenb1Ut.y in 1.1mited situations to obtain 
greater benefit for the Oovernment. However, it was still contemplated 
that the great volume or purchases and contracts would be made b;y 
advertising £or bids. 
Subsequent experience, how-ever, has not borne this out. In 
terme of dollar value, by tar the largest volume or procurement actions 
bas been negotiated. Negotiated contract• have represented more than 
eighty-tllo per cent ot procurement actions each 1ear since the outbreak 
or the Korean emergency. The compariscm or negotiated and formally 
advertised. procurement eince 1951 is shewn in Table IV on page 22. 
over eeventy per cent or the dollar value ot procurement b7 
negotiation was attributed to three exceptions to tormal advertised. 
bidding. 
l. 1or technical or specialized suppllea requiring substantial 
TABLE IV 
---
OT VAWE OP MILITARI PRCXJUtmMmf ACTICUS 
WITH BUSDiESS FIRMS Fat waut IM mE UMITED STATES 
CLASSIFIED BI METHm or PROOURENENT 
F.iacal ?ears 195'1-1962 
Total Formally Advertised Negotiated 
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liacal tear let Value Procurement Procurement (Millions) m:mons Per cent RrmoruJ Per cent 
l9Sl • .30,823 • 3,720 12.1 • 27,10) 87.9 
19S2 bl,h82 4,479 10.8 ;1,003 89.2 
1953 27,822 3,089 ll.1 24,733 88.9 
1954 11,~8 1,789 lS.6 9,6S9 84.4 
19SS 1.h,9.30 2,;86 16.0 12,Shh 84.0 
19S6 17,750 2,81$ lS.9 14,935 84.1 
1951 19,133 3,)21 17.4 15,812 82.6 
1958 21,827 3,11.s 11.3 18,712 as.1 
l9S9 22,7b4 3,089 13.6 19,6$S 86.4 
1960 23,hll 3,361 lh.8 20,.076 as.2 
1961 2h,126 4,098 16.2 20,028 SJ.8 
1962 26,481 3,914 14.2 22,S67 as.a 
- -Total.a f281,997 tlb,30) u.4 t247,69b 87.6 
SWRCEt 19,$1...1962• Depart.ment ot Detenae, Military Prime Contract 
Awards to Small Business end other Oontractors, Ju'q' 1961-
June 1962, pages 24, 27J 1962. Small Business Administration, 
Office ot Procurement end Technical Asai.stance, March 1963. 
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initial investment or extended period of preparation for manufacturers, 
thirty-three per cent. 
2. For experimental development and research contracts,, 
eighteen and nine-tenths per cent. 
3. As impractical to aecure ccmpeti tioo. by formal adv6rt1sing1 
eighteen and six-tenths per cent. 
lt is significant that an imperceptible proportion had been 
negotiated attar advertising tailed. fable V on page 2h., shows the break• 
down ot negotiated p.roourement by the serv1ce1 in fiscal year 1962 end 
the assigned reasons for using tbia method. 
J.s the agent ot the United States Congress responsible tor 
detemining hov well the executive agencies are handling their at/airs, 
the General Accounting Oltice baa favored advertised procurcaent and has 
been critical of the military aenices for resorting to negotiated pro-
CUl"Sent aa much u they do. The und.erlJ'ing rea1ona tor the preference 
tor edvertieing are the assumption that advertiaina will generall.7brina 
the lowest price, and the desire to allow t1VeJ70ll8 in the count17 to 
canpete tor the Government buainess involving public funda. Q>. the 
other band, negotiated contract prices muet be based largely on estimated 
coats oZ prodUCticn, and the Government generally does not have the 
assurance ot lair and reasonable pricing normally afforded by .tree 
TABLE V 
-
HET VALU! OF MILIT.ARI PROOUREMEU'l' ACTIUiS UNDFR NEGOl'IATED CONTRACTS 
fiscal Year 1962 
(Doller Amounts in Thousands) 
Negotiated author:l.tyl 
Total Net VQ1Ue Hot Value 
Amount Per Cent Arrrr:I Navy Air Force 
Total negotiated contracta2 22,$67,19.3 100.0 b,829,088 6,S96,~1 11,142,0ldl 
1. lfotional emergency (total) 627,974 3.0 25li396 177,468 198,610 
a. Labor surplus area and 
indwttr.r set-aside 121,486 .6 85,159 18,78S 16,942 
b. Small business set-sside 
(unilateral) 61,280 .3 30,6o6 4,6$5 26,019 
c. Disaster area set-aside3 
- - - - -d. Experimental, developmental 
or research less 't.han 
~100,000. 4 250,090 1.2 89,024 ?L,359 86,707 
e. Honperishable subsistence . 63,3.37 .3 62,760 4 513 
£. Modifications authorized 
by existing contract 
negotiated prior to 
Lo,1so Je.nuar.r l, 19S6 .2 -6.3,112 55,3hS 48,517 
g. Actions more than $110~ 
but not more than ~215 91,031 .h 46,8$9 24,.320 19,852 
2. Public exigency 199,218 .9 41,lhO 81,283 76,795 
3. Purchases not more than ~21500 67<l,292 3.2 293,395 lfJJ,495 201,402 
110 u.s.c. 23oh(a) includes modifications pursuant to terms or existing 
negotiated contracts; however, statutory negotiation authority was not required nor 
U$ed. Modifications are classified according to the atatutor.r authority applicable 
to the existing contracts which they modify. 
2Excludes intregoverrunental procurement. 
3No disaster areas were designated for procureIUent purposes during 1962. 
4Public Law OS-800 provided that such purchases could be negotiated under 
exception 91 which previously had been limited to perishable subsistence. 
SPublic tnw 8.$-800 provided that such purchases could be negotiated under 
exception J, 1'.ilich previously had been limited to actions of not more than $1,ooo. 
TABLE V 
-
(Continued) 
Total Net Value Net Val\te 
lfegotiated autb.ori:t7 
.Amount Per Cent Anrq Navy 
4. Personal or prof'eaaional 
service a 81,66S .ti b2,387 13,492 
s. Services or educational 
institutions 33.S,818 1.6 84,799 89,81.h 
6. Purchases outside the u.s. 1,111,226 s.2 S9h,SSl.i 319,539 
1. Medicines tr medical supplies Jl,9.59 .2 408 3.3,018 
8. Supplies purchased tor 
suthorimed resale 128,5.SS .6 99,Slh 11,769 
'· f'erishablo or nonperishable ht6,7S9 hll,381 subeiotence 1.9 1,982 
10. Impracticable to secure ccm-
petition by tomal advertising),9661992 18.6 h61,3h2 l,298,k39 
u. Experimental, developmental, 
L,o27,67S 16.9 h87,228 or research SOJ,6S7 
12. Classified purchases 6)0,148 3.0 100,733 SJ.7,293 
U • Technical equipment requiring 
standardisation and inter-
changeability' of perts 
11.. Technical or specialized 
12,697 .1 S,.51.S 7,286 
supplies requiring substantial 
initial investment or extended 
period ot prepe.ratiou !or 
33.06 284,379 2,308,903 manufacture 71022,201 1S. Negotiation after advertising 2,268 187 939 
16. Purchases to keep facilities 
available 1n the interest of 
national. defense or industrial 
6.3 944,096 mobilization l,34S,S73 362,$21 
17. Otherwise authorized b1' law 670,6lh 3.1 278,067 267,126 
6x.esa than 0.1 ot l per cent. 
8CllnCE1 Sull Buainee Administration, Office of Procurement and Technical 
Aasistance, Washington, D. c. March, 196.3. 
2ha 
Air Force 
2S,786 
161,20S 
203,135 
53.3 
17,272 
3,396 
2,101,211 
3,036,790 
12,122 
96 
h,428,919 
1,142 
38,9$6 
12S,621 
2S 
campet1t1ve conditions. !be General Accounting Of'fice rec:ognisee-
1ndeed the lsv makes proviaion tor it-that negotiation is both neceaaaJ7 
and desirable under certain circumstances, sucn as procurlng complex 
weapons, but that even in au.ch cases, the Department ot Defense ehould. 
provide effective competition throllgb the design, research, and develop-
ment stages in weapon qateme contracting. U competitive condi tione 
are not allotted to prevail through d.eeign and development stages, the 
General Accounting ottice believes then ie little likelihood or effective 
competition for subsequent prodUction contracta. 
!he General Accounting Office further contends that while nego-
tiation might be the accepted method of procurement in acne segments 
of private industry and business, equal opportunity to all businesna 
to aupplT the needs of our Government ia important in the Nation's tree 
enterprise econavJ that full and free ccnpetition is important to 
econardc•l procurement bJ the Oovemment. hceptiona to tben principles, 
in the tom of authority to negotiate contracts with Umited competition, 
should be granted onl.1 when it ia impractical or againat the public 
int.res\ to submit the needs og the Governt!lellt to all qualitied suppliers 
b7 formal sdVert1aing tor bids. 
ARGUMENTS J'Ql NEGOTIATED PRCCUREM.ENTS 
the Department of Defenae takes the position that, in view of the 
fnd.ft changes in world event.a and the constant acceleration of technolog-
ical developn.ents, the vast inajori'Q"' ot the mill ta!7 procurement doll.era 
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'1\l&t be contracted tor b7 the negotiated method. In addition, the socio-
logical aims i'ulfilled b7 military procurement can on'l1' be met by a 
departure trQ'll etraight. !ormol advertising. The Department of Defense 
contends that it can procure better by negotiation of aircra!t, aircraft 
engines, complex electronics items, and weapons systems. lrequentl.7 the 
military services invite proposals tor the manufacture or an item about 
1dhich thoy know little more than the desired performance characteristics. 
Proposals to such invitations ere as much sugcestiona ot how vork oan be 
performed. as they are price quotations. These proposals must be evaluated 
technicalq to detennine which vill beat aecanplish the job. In such 
eituations, migot1ation is the method or procurement. On the other bend, 
the Department or Defense believes th.at for standard commercial-type 
material, baaed on clear-cut specifications, as well as tor construction, 
advertising 1a pre!erable. 
file Department ot Defense maintains that 1 t is a mistake to 
easume that negotiation means lack ot canpetition. In addition, it 
claims that campet1 ticn can be just aa ef.f'ect1 ve in negotiation as it is 
in advertising. Unlees the item to be bwght is available onl.7 trara a 
aingle aource, the procedure in negotiation is to solicit proposals 
from a number o! source1h After t.he proposals are rec.eived and evalu-
ated, it is the practice o! ma117 procuring uni.ta to call in all or some 
of the potential contractors and to negotiate 'With th• on price as well 
aa on other raot.ora. T"ne Department, ot De.tense indicates that while 
techniques of negotiation may va:q from unit to unit, they make an effort 
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to obtain tbe lowest price .from each proposer, ao that each ia negoti-
ating in an· atmosphere of awareness that others are ccapeting tor the 
same contract. 
Another blending of the two methods 1s found in the "two-step 
fonnel advertising" procedure recentl.1 adopted experimentall.1' by the 
Air Force tor procuremeni'. When the service dou not have detailed 
perrormance apec1£1cat.1cns-or is unable to prepare them accurately 
enough-to define precisel.T the desired product •package", negotiating 
procedures ere utilised to obtain technical proposals wi.thou.t prices 
tram a nmnber of detense contractors. The proposal.8 are reviewed in 
Air Force laboratories to determine the technical acceptability of the 
products orf ered and to evolve from them the precise per.romance 
characteristics desired. Those contractors whose proposed products are 
acceptable are given the opportunity to bid under normal advertising 
procedures tor award to the lowest responeive bidder. 
An additional reason, according to the Department ot De.tense, 
for the largo amount ot negotiation is that the administrative coats o~ 
advertised procurement are likely to be considerably higher than those 
ot negotiated procurement. The greater the number of invitationa to 
bid and ot plans and specifications, t.he greater the time and ettorte 
)Eightieth United States Congress, First Session, House ot 
Representatives, Commit.tee on Appropriations, SUbcounittae on Detense 
Appropriations, Hearing• for 1960, Part S, pages h93, 521-522. 
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of Jr.Ore people involved in the preparation ot bid sets, the ancillal7 
problems of tiling and record keeping, all contribute to making the 
administrative coat. of advertiaing higher than negotiation. fbis coat 
18 Jwrt.ifiable where the item is of such nature that an overall 
economic advantase to the Governtaent can be upeoted. Al.most five 
million procurement actions annual.17 tor $21.$00 or leas an made through 
negotiation which is permitted by' law to save aclmin1atrative costs. 
1'he Assistant Secretaq ot Defense (Supp~ and Logiatica) favored. an 
increase in this exemption to ten thousand dollars.4 
There ere certain atetutoq and administrative controls which 
have the effect ot diverting contracts from one contractor to another 
on baaes other than price and performance. Thq are polioy determina-
t.10118 tor pu.rpoees other than procurement objectives end include such 
legislation u the Small Busineaa Act. 
Participation by small business concerns in Defense Department 
procurement is a declared objective of Congress. The basic polio;r 1e 
that small bu$1neas shall obtain •.•tsir proportion• or the total 
purchases and contracts tor supplies sud servlces f w the Government. 
In addition to atating this basic policy in the Armed Semen Procurement 
bunited states Congress, Senate SUbcaft!Bittee ot the Armed 
Servicea Coamdttee, Hearings on Senate Bill 50011 Senate Bill 13831 
and Senate Bill 187$1 July 131 15, 21, 24, 28, and .31, 1962, page 79. 
Act, Congress has aaaigned the Small Business Administration the !unction 
ot seeing ~ it that the policy is carried out. file Small Business 
Administration performs a nUlllber or tuncticns calculated to assist small· 
business concerns. Among them is the screening of all Department or 
Defense procurements in excess or ten thousand dollars and entering into 
joint determinations with the contracting officer that some portion of 
each procurement deemed suitable tor small business be set aside for 
small business. ~'hat constitutes a 0fa1r proportion" has never been 
defined and es a result there appears to be a wide difference ot opinion 
cri whether a.mall business is receiving a ".t•ir proportionn Of total 
Department. ot Defense procurements. The small business proportion of 
the total milltar;y procurements has, however, been declining in recent 
T•an. In fiscal year 1957 1 Sl'llall business accounted tor nineteen and 
eight-tenths per cent ot military procurement, in fiscal year 1958, 
seventeen and one-tenth per cent, in fiscal 7eu- 19591 sixteen and aix-
tentha per cent, in fiscal year 1960, sixteen and one-tenth per cent, 
in .t'1scal year 1961, :.CUteen and nine-tenths per cent, and in tiscel 
yeaz 19621 seventeen and seven-tenths per cent.S 
Table VI on page 301 shows that small business obtained only 
five end nine-tenths per cent ot the procurement swu'da of ten thousand 
dollars or more in the heaV equipment and weapons program and 
Sortiee of the Assistant Secreta17 of Defense f'or Installations 
and Logistics, "~ll Business Program Fiscal ?ear 1962 Report, page one. 
TABLE VI 
-
SMALL BUSINESS PRCCURDU!Bt PROORAM 
JUL? 1961 - JUD 1962 
Fiscal tear 1962 
(Ammnte in Milliona) 
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All Business J'irms Small Business Firms 
Net Value Net Value Per cent 
~or Bard Good.at 
Aerona Ol 610,ooo or more 1!71637.6 $11101.0 i_.9 
ilrcraft 6,801.0 37h.1 2.1 
Guided Niaailea Systems S,oL.3.3 96.2 1.h 
Shipe 1,887.8 i1e.o a.2 
7ank-automot.1ve b.37.l 11.s 16.6 
Weapons 234.b 4b.l 13.9 
.Anmnmitia:& bhS.o 54.o 12.6 
ilectronica and eanmunications 
equipment 2,790.0 3S2.8 10.3 
Serv.1.ceat 
3ei'Vice• Pre>&nmt Awsrde 2,Jl.4.~ 372.0 lh.2 
All Othtll'I I 61528.1 ~11.lU.O b9.9 
SUbsiatenee 4§1i. 307.s s4.t 
Text.ilea, Olotbini 6. equipage 1as.1 1$6.S 10.1 
Fu.els and lubricants 988.b 219.2 21.4 
Miscellaneous hard sooda 593.7 378.6 constructicm JB.8 
Construction 1,939.8 1,0;1.1 6S.1 
Act1co1 of leas than t10,ooo 21026.z 110$0.4 62.4 
'total $26,481.0 14,622.0 17.7 
SCJJRCBa Small Busin1111 Administration, Office of Procurement and 
Technical Aesistance, Wsshington, D. c. March 1963. 
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tbirty-tour and two-tenths per cent o£ t.he service awards, but received 
forty-nine and.nine-tenths per cent ot certain other procurements, 
which accounts !or onl.7 approximately one-fourth of total procurements. 
This latter categ017 also includes all awards 0£ less than ten thousand 
dollars. 
Small business received some awards in all ot the major hard.goods 
program, ranging tram one and tour-tenths per cent of the missile funds 
to sixteen and eigbt-tentba per cent of the tank-automotive awards. 
However, in the lg8regate, small business was able to compete succesa-
tull.7 !or only !ive and nine-tenths per cent of tho total awarded 
contJ"&CtS !or hard goods. 
Small-business opportunities also are limited in the services 
program awards, which in tiscal year 1962 represented eight and seven-
tenths per cent ot all the militar;y awards. '.the small-business share 
in this catego.ey was th.irt.Y-tour and two-tenths per cent. One reason 
tor this is that experimental, developmental, and research contracts 
accounts tor about half or this services category. Contracts for 
utilities, usually available onlJ' to large companies, also are included 
in this category. 
In some soft-goods areas, such es tor subsistence and textiles, 
small-business concerns are accounting !or well over half the volume of 
awards. Small business is also participating in sixty-five per cent 
ot construction awards. Almost two-third.a ot all contracts valued at 
less than ten thousand dollars are going to small business concerns. 
THE GOVER}!Kfu"iT1S LABCR SURPLUS AREA PHOORAM 
Under defense manpower policy, there is a procedure whereby 
contracts may be channeled into distressed. labor areas where the 
Secretary o! Labor determines that there is widespread unemployment. 
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Tne procedure is quite similar to that under the small business 
provisions. It entails a determination by the contracting officer of 
the optimum quantity of a given item to be purchased which would. probebl,y 
result in the most favorable price, considering the manufacturing 
processes involved and the quantity required tor en economical production 
run. Unrestricted procurement is then initiated tor at least this smeunt 
and a set-aside to surplus-manpower areas mq be made tor not less than 
that amount. 'l·he se't-aside portion ct the contract is awarded only 1.f 
the offer meets the price at which the unrestricted portion is awarded. 
In a tie-bid pre!erence, awards ue made to bidders in labor-surplus 
areas wnoee bids match those or competing !inns outside labor-surplus 
areas. llormally in a tie-bid situation a drawing is held to determine 
which bidder is to receive the sward. 
In addition, the Of tice of the Civil Defense Mobilization has 
ofrered incentives in the form or accelerated amort12ation or emergency 
facilities to defense contractors who locate their plants in surplus 
labor areas. However, the effectiveness o.r tt.e entire program has been 
ne61i£ible. The Dopart.m~nt of Defense procurement actions involving 
set-asides or tie-bid pref erencea in labor surplus areu amounted to 
only one hu."ldred seventy-nine million dollars in fiscal year 19626• 
SUMMARY 
In summar.y of this background discussion on militar;y -procurement, 
it io epparent that the can.plexity and urgency ot military needs appeu 
to override other considerations. There is the possibility o£ large 
suppl.¥ needs tor defense :for years to come, despite hopes ot settlement 
of the world's disputes. The defense share ot the national product is 
alread3 considerable. The Armed Services Procurement Act emphasizes the 
importance of utilising existing competition to the extent possible to 
obtain the best vslue to dei'ense in military supply. But when the 
necessity of situations permit negotiated contracting, there is a con-
ccmitant responsibility to prudently utilize all relevant cost data ot 
prime contractors and subcontractors in such price determinations. More 
consideraticn, it appears, should be given to the Department ot Defense 
to ccmpl.ying with the intent and spirit of the law by utilizing procure-
ment authority to preserve the basis or .future competition to the extent 
present military needs permit. 
6orfice of the Secretary of Defense, Awards in Labor Surplus 
Areas and Industries Report, October 51 1962. 
CHAPrErt. IV 
-
Within the last tew years, beginning notably with the Air Force 
procurement or the B-S8 bomber in 1954, the so-called weapon-syotem 
concept has become important. The change here is particularly noteworthy 
since it means placing the total system responsibility (excluding only 
power plant in the case of the B-58) in the hands ot a single source. 
Prior to t."rl.s t.ime, the major components-such as air!rame, bombardment-
navigation system, or communications equ.ipaent-were bought tran 
separate sources and were Government .f'urnished equipment to be incorpo-
rated 1n the linal product by the airframe producer. Under the wea:pon-
~atem concept, these itms become contractor turniehed equipment, and 
a singlo vendor assumes complete responsibility tor the total system. 
In varying degree, this concept bas now been applied to other major eir 
£orce procurements such ao the B-701 the F-108, TFX planes, and the 
Atlss, Titan, and Thor missiles. 
There are two major reeacns tor t.bia new way of buying weapons. 
First, the mating or system integration problem-that is, the 
combining of the various components into the £1nal asaembly-becc:mes 
more and more severe es weapon-system canplexitzy' increases. Obviously, 
when separate producers are developing ea.ch of the component i te.ms, in 
the course ot the years that elapse frail initial projection to delivery, 
lS 
the aearch !or high per.tormance mq lead to departures . r.rm specitieation 
and configuration that will make mating vellnigh imposeible. 'lhia 
becanes particularl.7 important in airborne vehicles 1 where . the search 
.tor weight and space eavings is extremelT important and the configuration 
ol the .final structure has a mar.ked e.f'.tect on total per.t'ormance. 
Second, there are operational problems which cannot be taken 
tull.y into account in evaluating the separate articles. It is cml3' as 
a total qstem that the equipment is operational and all the problems 
involved in both its airborne 4nd ground handling aetivitiea become 
apparent. Let us develop these two points. 
As the milito.ry moved toward the more and more advanced equipment 
they haft repeated.13' encountered situations 1n which one component meeta 
or exceeds the original apecU'ications and another !alls behind b7 a 
wide margin. Under these circumstances, the final system integration 
ueual1¥ produces am article which suffers from the loweat level ot 
component. acbiev$8nt. To deal with this problem and to ensure greater 
comparability of t.be ccmpcments, the weapon-qatem concept has developed 
with the hope ot insuring capability of the 1'1nal uaemb17. There baa 
been considerable discussion and negatiYe crit.icia of this approach 
because 1 t reduces the number ot prime contractors and places a great 
deal ot economic power in the hand ot the eucceastul bidder. 
It is recognized, of course, that inherent in the ue of the 
weapons-system method or. procurement are certain features which mq 
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operate to the detriment of small manufacturers. For example, Congress 
has passed lava And procurement regulations have been designed to carq 
out the mandate that small business recein a fair share of the m1lite17 
procurement dollar. Examples are the small business set-aside program, 
the CertU'ic•'te of Competenc7 Program,7 and the existing Department ot 
Detense -.all busineaa programs and regulations, and the tree and open 
campetit1.on brought about b7 the basic requirement of tbe procurement 
laws that contracts be let t.hrough advertising. Not all of tb.eae can 
be extended, nor can thq be imposed on prime contractors in dealing 
with their aubcontractore. Thus, it mq be aaid that the weapcms-qatem 
method ot procurement can be utilised to avoid not only the effect ot 
these programs and lava, but also the responsibill t7 tor carr,ying out 
the small business program established by Congress. 
7certitieatea of Canpetency are authorised bJ' Section 8(b)(7) 
of the Small Busineaa Act. In accordance with this Act, gavemment 
cOZ'ltracting officers are responsible for referral to-the Small Business 
Administration of t.he proposed rejection ot the bid proposal ot a small 
buainess concern because or lack of capacity or credit. 'fh1a Certi.fi-
cate of Competency Program ia in effect an appeal. procedure available 
to a small busineaa firm whose bid or proposal for a contract b7 a 
government agenc7 is to be rejected under the aforementioned circum-
stances. A Certificate ot Competency is a written instnment issued b7 
the Small Business Administration. It is addressed to a government 
contractiug o!ticer certif71ng that after e:xami nation ot all pertinent 
tacts the small canpall1' cited therein possesses the capacity' and credit 
to perform a specific government contract.. It the Small Business Admin-
istration denies issuance ot the Certificate ot Competency, then the 
contracting officer can award the contract in quest.ion to tb& next low 
qualil'led bidder. 
37 
The weapona-aystem method, if extended, could have serious 
effects on ccmpeti Uon. The number ot companies capable of efficient 
production of tanks, planea, and guided missiles are 11m1ted. Thus, 
the can.petJ.tion between these companies tor the large prime contracts 
ia Umi ted, particularl;y it engineering, management, and production 
efficiency are the chief concem. But, perhapa more important £raa the 
small businen point of vlew, the ccmpetition tor the product.ion or the 
many thou1Jand.s of components o! a tank, plane, or guided missile that 
can be prodUced b7 small as well as large concerns may also be limited 
if the prime contractor doea not seek open competitive bids from hia 
subcontractors. 
Under the weapons-system, the prime contractor and not the 
Government determines what work will be performed in the tscilities ot 
tho prime contractor and what work will be subcontracted to small 
business. Thus, the dec1a1ons of the prime contractor and not the 
Government may have a profound et.teat upon the em.all business share of 
the procurement dollar and be beyond the control of Congress. 
there have been various definitions of the weapons system. 
Some o! these detinitiona appear so broad that they may be said to 
encompass the bulk of military procurement. The need for the veapoms-
aystem method ot procurement must be admitted for acne types of items. 
However, tba use or this method should be ver.1 closely related to the 
necessif.1' for its use and such benefits as might accrue to the more 
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efficient defense contractors. Because ot the d:lf'ticulties inherent in 
a broad use of' the vespons system, its use should be limited to those 
certain large and ccimpla: items on the ottice of Defense Mobilization 
preferential planning list which cannot be produced b7 small business. 
SUcb a lim1tation will meet the needs ot the m1lita17 procurement 
agencies without operating to the detriment or the small business 
economy. 
CHAPTER V 
-
LACK OP catPETITION IN .MILIATRI PROOUREMENT 
AND ITS IMPACT <Jf SMALL BUSINESS 
Competition in military procurement is an ingredient which is 
absolutel.¥ necessary aince it bas been shown over and over again that 
competition results in savings to the Government, and, in most cases, 
results in the deliveey ot a better product. The statistics on 
'lable IV on page 22 show that eight7-!ive and eight-tenths per cent 
of the total defense dollar award.a in tiscal year 1962 were made through 
negotiation. A veey large percentage of these negotiated contracts were 
negotiated with a sole eatll"Ce, hence ettective competition was lacking. 
Figures furnished b7 the Department ot Detense show that in the 
past tiecal year new procurements, excluding intragovernmmtal and 
moditications ot existing contracts, totaled $18, 7891936,ooo. 01' this 
amount tut.J-two end tour-tenths per cent was negotiated with a sole 
source. Another report issued by the Department ot De.f'enae ahows that 
in fiscal 7G&r 1962 ot the $26148019871969 net value of military con-
tracts awarded, seventy-one and one-tenth per cent were awarded to 
one hundred companies. Breaking this down to an even more interesting 
figure, on't1' twenty- companies received fifty-one and two-tenths per 
cent or tbe total procureto.ent dollar. 
The explanation given £or thia trend is the complexlV ot new 
weapons and th& exigencies of ti.'119. It is dilticult to believe that 
the lessening or e.t.rective competition, which the negotiation method ot 
procUl'eIMnt brings about is desirable, or that. competition would lengthen 
the time or deliveJ'1' 1n most cases of needed weapons. Rather, competition 
would stimulate deliveey and also add incentive to compet.ing canpanies 
to provide better products. '.?he time should never come when thia count17 
will have to abandon the principle ot full and free competition through 
equal opportunity-. 
Senator John Sparkman called public attention to savings to the 
Government resulting from the of.torts of just one Nav Department bU7ing 
office to invite competition on a long list ot cmponents which torm.erlT 
had been purchaaed .tram aole sources of nupplJ". 6 
It was ahovn that during 19.58, nineteen small business concema 
bid tor the first time en thirty-eight or .forty-two aole source items 
purchased by toe Nev's ships parts control center at Mechanicsburg, 
Penns7lvania. Four large concerns also bid for the f'irat time on tour 
or these eolc-aource products. Aa a result ot opeuins these bide to 
ccmpetition, the Navy saved. &92,lSJ or ssvenv per cent less than what 
8Addrea1 before the United statea Senate, April l9S9, page 622s, 
l9S9 Congre11ional. Record--Sena'h. 
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these products would. have cost had they continued to be bought from the 
£ormer sole-source suppliers. 
!'rem this instance, and trcm subseQUent experiments by various 
military purchasing ot!ice11 to eliminate unnecessUT sole-source blzying, 
it is clearl7 evident tha.t sole-source non-competitive purchesing has 
been coating the American taxpayer wJ.lliona or dollars in mlnecessary 
expenditures. 
Tb.is concentration or Government procurement dollars in a mere 
handf'Ul of companies, end the tremendous use of sole-source negotiation 
by the Department ot Defense is particularly hamf'ul to our sm1.1ll 
business cOlllm'Ulli t7 since small business recei vea only ten &nd. three-ten.the 
per eent of all negotiated awuds s.s ca:npared to a verr creditable 
fi.i'ty-tour and seven-tenth.a per cent ot advertised avards.9 Some or the 
large and more complex procurement contn.cta 'Which the Department of 
Defense enters into cannot be per.f'ormed bT small 'business. However, 
there ere many that small business crui pcrtorm. If more OMall businesses 
were given knowledge or tho items needed by the Government, they could 
success!Ul~ compete ror more or these contracts. One or the best. wqs 
to provide the public with this infonnation is to make sure that more 
procurements were published in the Commerce Business Daill published by 
the Department ot Commerce. The Senate Benking and Currency Committee 
9orfica o! the Secretary of Defense, Mili!:!fl Prime Contract 
Awards, report !or Jul.11961 - June 1962. 
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has pending be.tore it a cammittee bill which contains the provisions ot 
a bill introduced last aeaeion b7 Senator nart ot Michigan. This pro-
vision would require the Secretary of Commerce to publish in the 
Commerce Business Da1!l all detenae procurements of ten thousand dollars 
and above and all civilian procurements or one thousand dollars and 
aboVe• except procurements involving periabablea end procurements involv-
ing national securi t;.y. U this bill is enacted, more procurements will 
be publicized and consequently more small businesses will know what the 
Government 1a b'Uling. 
Another method to secure more participation b7 small busineaa 
1u Government procurement. and reduce the 11.llm'ber ot sole source procura-
•nts is to make more dravinga and specifications available vbicb are 
auitable tor formal advertising. It ia otten tbe case at the present 
time tbat certain 1tezns are repeatedly procured trcm the a.me sole source 
ma1n13' beceuse ot the f ailun or the procuring agencies to provide draw-
ings and apecitications. .Procurement contracts should provide, wherever 
practical, that engineering drawings and manut'acturing data should 
beccne the property or the Government. Thia llOU.ld result :ln this data 
being used in subsequent reprocurcment and it would serve to broaden 
the base of potential sources ot suppl¥ tor theae items. ldlen this base 
is broadened, more IJlTlall buainessee will be qualified to bid on these 
i tens and when t.he volme and coat of equipment acquired annual~ is 
considered, tbia could result in quite a signit1cant increase in small 
busineae participation. 
ml PROBLEM Ci' MOST GOVWME.NT 'l'EClllfICIANS' 
AND BU!ERS1 HATURAL TDIDENCI TO FAV<:a 
THE ES1'ABLIS!lIID SOURCES OF SlJPPU 
There is • basic conflict between the desire or the mill tar;y 
departments to obtain the beat equi}Jflent, poaaible with the least ettort 
and 1n the least time poeaible and, on the other band, tb.e desire of 
Congrese that the greatest degree ot competition be ma1ntained. The 
engineers and teohn1c1ana of the various procurement .agencies. as vell 
as the line officers reaponaible tor: the use ot the equipment, knov 
that 1t camp&m1' A is in production of a particular piece ot eq\lipnent, 
that ccspany can probablJ' aupp'J¥ good material taster than it the pro-
curement is put out m bid end some small outfit that bas never 
produced the item before gets the bid. They fear that perhaps the new 
campaey 1411 not really understand all the technical problems in\rolved, 
may not have sutticient trained personnel, and in general, they are 
loyal to their old brand. The bigger companies have enough technical 
personnel to .turnish to tb.e services to help them solve their problems. 
It is perfectly natural that the service personnel ahould be strongly 
disposed to uao cne ot the marq exceptions avail.able under the Armed 
Services Procurement Regulations to ask £or a contract negotiated with 
one or tvo cmpanies, . 
No one would den,y that often the best interests ot the count17 
can be served by routing orders to a well-established Cmpat11' who 
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thorough~ understands the needs to be met and baa great experience in 
producing the needed equipment. But there ia another side ot the stoey. 
Much ot the lldventage which these larger companies enjOJ 1• the 
result ot Government action in tho tint place. During World War II, 
auc1 to same extent duri.ng thelorean conflict, the urgency ot getting 
new kinds of equipment was even greater than 1 t is today. The national 
fl!IHrgenc1 required tbat the services go to the companies who had the 
big research eta.rte end ask them to produce equipment to meet e particu-
lar need aa quiclcl.7 aa possible and in as large quantities aa possible. 
Even todq the companies who have the mesua to do research must be 
relied upon heavily to meet de!ocse needs. Once a Can.pa'D3 has developed 
a prcduct, the experience it bas gained gives it a tremendous edge in 
later production. 
Small business representative• and even the contracting officers 
themselves are in a relative]Jr weak position when thq attempt to con-
test the recommendations ot the technical personnel that equipment 
ahould be purchased fraa a parttcular source because of ita superior 
quality. 
The practice o! the technical sections making recamnendationa as 
to \Ulat source should receive a contract 18 one wbich ought to be care-
fUll;y looked at. There m11.7 be cues where tbia ia neceaaar.y, but if the 
apecitication1 are well written, if the contracting oftioera make use 
ot their facilities for checking on the ability ot ccnpaniea to make the 
products the7 bid on, the choice ot sources could be le.tt to canpetiUon 
to a much greater extent than 1a now the case. 
Jollouitlg is an excerpt !rOl4 the Comptroller General 1 s Report 
dated Januar;y 291 1963) which aptlJ' pointa out the prevailing adverse 
tendenc,y ot Government agencies tailing to use drnings tor advertised 
procurement a 
Oar review at the Aviation Supply Qf'fice diacloaed that 
draw111p frequently were not utilized to solicit canpetitive 
bids for follow-on procurement and that procurement was being 
made attor negotiation with only one supplier in about seventy-
81.x per cent of t.he cesea examined. A compari.scn ot a l1mi ted 
number of instances llhere identical items had beon procu.nd 
both through negotiation and through coapetitive bidding re• 
vealed that aaTings effected through ccnpetition exceeded 
forty per cent ot the sole source prices. 
At the Aviation Supply o.ttice, Pbiladelphia1 we uamined 
three hundred thil'tJ•ni.ne procurement action.a reported in the 
montb of Marcb 1962. We found that 2S9 of the actions (seventy-
eix per cent) were awarded after negotiation vi.th only one 
supplier. In 2.33 cases (ninaty per cent of tbe negotiated 
procurements or aixt7-n1ne per cent of' the total procurement 
actions reported) tbe Aviation SupplT Office atated that 
uesotiationa were justified on the basis that it wee impractical 
to secure competition because adequate data vere not available 
on the i tans being procured. Drewinga and technical data 
supplied b7 the original contractors ordinarily conatitute the 
data upon which such determination should be baaed. However, 
our detailed review of th1rt7 per cent negotiated procurement 
actions selected at rand.an disclosed that, in twenty-five ol 
t.be thirty cases, the Aviation Supply 01'.f'ice technical personnel 
bad not determined 1£ drawings were available tor review end 
use tor canpetitive procurement. In the remaining five casea, 
ve were unable to determine 'Whether or not drawings had been 
reviewed. our review disclosed that identical items had been 
previously procured in all ttrl.rV inatancea--in twenty-tour 
cues, under Bureau ot .Aeronautics contracts. Examination ot 
the twenty-tour Bureau of Aeronautics contracts further die-
c losed that twenty-three ot the twenty-tour contracts required 
the contractor t,o turnish drawings and also gave the Government 
the right to use the drswinss for Govemment purposes wJ. th out 
limitat1m •. Further examnation of a number of these ca.sea 
confirmed that drawings actually had been received and were 
readiey available to the Aviatim SUpplJ' Office. In several 
cases, ve obtained copies of the drawings and requested the 
opinion of the Aviation Supply Office technical personnel as 
to the adequ.aey of the drawings for uae in competitive procure-
ment. In sane cases, the Aviation SUppl.y Office personnel 
indicated that the drawings could have been used in aolicit.ing 
campctitioa. In other cases, the technical personnel felt 
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that the drawings could not. have been eo used because they did 
not contain a re.t'erence to the applicable material 8;)eo1i'ications 
or did not renal proprietary inf omation known on]¥ to the 
original mauutacturer. In spite o! the failure to review 
drawings, the unavailabiUt7 of adequate data was cited b7 the 
Aviation Suppl.1 O!i'ice u juatif'ication for procurement b.Y 
negotiation 1n enenty per cent ot these thirty procurmnent 
actions. 
A compa.rison ot !orty.five examples obtained tram the 
Avie\ion Supp17 otrice of inatanees in which identical items 
had been procured both through negotintion and througb c.ompeti-
tive bidding disclosed that, on .an overall basis, the sovinge 
e.rrected on ccmpeti ti ve procurements exceeded torv per cent 
or the cost of' procuring the aame qwmtitiea at the sole source 
unit prices. In a number or instances, the competitive unit 
prices were less thau forty per cent ot the sole source prices 
previoual.T paid. k'e believe these example• are indicative ot 
the potential savings which can be achieved through competition. 
The tollowJ.ng schedUle presents a comparison of the volume 
of negotiated and adv•rtised procurement. b7 the Aviation Suppl.7 
Oflice for the past two fiscal years. lt is noted that the 
value or negotiated prccurement in 1962 vu more than double 
that or 1961. 
Fiscal Year 19~1 1962 
Contracts a Pe~ cent Per cent 
Negotiated 12,823 as 20,S36 86 
Advertised 2,273 lS 2,828 12 
7otal is,o96 100 2.3.,364 100 
Values $244,633,748 88 $.$20,86.3,0S6 llegotiated 9$ 
Advertised ).3,322,924 12 30,84S,412 s 
Tot el $277,956,672 100 $.$Sl,708,468 100 
Since the Aviation Suppl7 Oft.ice procurement is generallT 
in the nature o£ replenishment of etocks of it.ema for which 
drawings and technical data have previously been procured end 
81.nce theue drawings are supposed to be stored at the neighbor-
ing naval aviation suppl;y depot., we believe that the Aviation 
Supply 01'.t'iee should be 1n a favorable position to e.f.t'ect 
substantial savings througl"• tho use of competitive bidding. 
Du.ring oiu- review, we learned that t..'le Aviation supply 
h7 
Office had initiated an independent study of the use of draw-
i,ngs. We discussed the nature 0£ the study and its n;aults to 
date with the Aviation Suppl,y Ot!ice of'.ficial rcaponsiblo for 
conducting the study and learned that this study confirmed mr 
.findings that drawings were not being properl.1' used. The 
Aviation SUppl.1' ot!ice study was still underway when we concluded 
our review. Ho-.-ever, tbe study group had proposed :several 
procedures designro to improve the utilization 0£ drawings. 
!.!CEPTICS 14 OF THE A.'IU'JID FCHCES ffiGCUfiE1C"'~ ACT OF 19h7 
'k'HICB LrriERALIZES TiIE u.:m OF llEUCllIATICll 
In the preceding discussion of the individual exceptions to 
advertised procurel'!H!lnt, 1 t vas pointed out. that °'"r seven billion 
dollors or about thirty-three per cent ot ell negotiated mill taey procure-
ments tor fiscal year 1962 were msde under exception (lh). Among other 
circumstances, this excepticn authorizes negotiation or a contract tor 
tecJmical or special propert,y 1! the Secretu.y ot the procuring depart-
ment determines that production o£ such propert:r rc~ires a substantial 
initial investment and !omal advertising might require duplication ot 
inveatttcnt or preparaticn already made. Armed Services iToC'Ul•em.ent 
Regulation. 3 .. 214.2 states that this exception will bo u:scd in situations 
where it 1a preferable to place a production contract w:it.h the supplier 
a-ho had developed the equi~nt, and ther&by assure to the Government 
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the benefit of the techniques, tooling, and equipment already' acquired 
by' that supplier.· Thia authorization 1a no less than an open invits.tion 
to award product.ion contracts to research and development contractors 
without competit.ion. 
Once a product has reached the production stage and it is 
possible to state all or a port.ion 0£ the contract requir£It<t'nts in 
specitication !or:n, it ia generally i.n the best interest of the Govern-
ment to obtain the greatest; competition. possible. 
Benefits in the .form of lower prices, new ideas and techniques, 
and a broader industrial base may be expilcted .from such procedure. To 
assume that capable and responsible producers cannot, or will not, be 
able to compete for a product the;r have not as yet produced sixnp~ 
because it 'ldll require a substantial initial investment to tool up and 
train employeos to build the product is a fallacy. 
Consideration should be given to mtending exception (14) to 
either eliminate duplioatiou cl a "substantial initial investment" as a 
factor justifiing negotiation, or to Umit the application of this 
factor in substantial in1 ti.al 1nvestmenta by- the Government which would 
require duplication b7 the Government in the event o! procurement trom 
a new supplier. 
The United States Code and 8l"med services procurement regulations 
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are suell that wide latitude 11 given procurement personnel at. teirl.T low 
echelona to enter into negotiated contracts. The writer haa found that 
the personnel w1 tll whom he hae had contact in varioua procurement 
agencies are tor the most part bcnest, intelligent people who are trying 
to p&r.t"orm their missions to the best of their capabilities. However, 
the7 are wrking under a system where the COlU"Se of least "aietance is 
to negotiate rather than to advertise end under a qstem which bu few 
check reins to promote adve:rtising tor bids. 
The weapon .. syatem concept, in etrect, promotes the Ver:! thing 
just discussed in the above paragraph. 'lhe proponent& of this procure-
ment practice rl.gbitully sq that in the highly advanced missilea, 
airera.ft, et cetra, of this day that components of these miesiles and 
aircrafi should be integrated through the grants ot research and develop.. 
ment funds to large corporations w1 th engineering star.rs carpable of 
designing tb.e1e iteu expeditiously. It ia true that moat small 
boaineaaes cannot do the research and. development ou 8\1Ch items as 
miasiles, ail'Cra.f.'t, and tanks. .But when research and developaen~ enda 
and .t'ore1gn production begins, small business then should properq 
function to its capacity in manufacturing iteme for which epecif1cationa 
should be available. 
During the research and development ot any given item, drawings 
are made and paid with b;y public .funds. Also working models are made 
be£ore production begine. At the point where the research and development 
so 
ends and maaa production begins, the specifications should be available 
tor biddingb7 firms interested in participating in production of it.au 
and components. Pra.cticall.7, small buaineaa is not able to participate 
because even at this point accurate apeci.f'ications are many times not 
available so that advertised bids can be let by procurement agencte·s. 
Because public i'unda are paying tor tbe development of BUCh data, 
apeciticationa should properly be available in all ca.sea after research 
and development ends and production 1s to begin. U aucb data ie not 
available or is incorrect, responsible part1e1 ahould be penalized just 
u would be the cue when aD.7 interior product is sold to the Oovemmeut. 
Corrective legislation in thia one area alone would save millions of 
dollars annual]¥. 
With present procurement regulations, personnel of rather lov 
echelon, in various qencies have authority to initiate negotiated pro-
curement either sole-source or with a vecy limited number ot firms 
although in many instances many firms ere actively qualified to produce 
items not obtained through negotiated procurements. Therefore, to control 
negotiated contracting, a Reviev Board should be established which would 
be responsible to Congress to decide whether or not net;otiated procure-
ments are in the best public interest. Thia Board woo.ld consist ot 
qualified technical personnel who could readilT ascertain by checking 
competent tiles whether several companies were capable ot producing 
siven parts. Tbe Soard would then give to the procwement ageney- a 
certificate or authorisation to proceed td.th a negotiated procurement in 
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the event such negotiated procurement were found by the Board t.o be in 
the best interest of the public. A determination or best public interest 
would include availability ot necessary apeci.ticationa and data, avail• 
abilit7 ot sources (small busineaa tirms particularl.7) tor the production 
ot such items, and a military need. ?he Board would review procurements 
1nvolVing ten thousand dollars or more. In the event of a negative 
determination by the Board, the Secretar.r ot Defense, who would be able 
to delegate autb.oritq to no leas then the Assistant Secretary level ot 
the particular procurement a.geney, could issue a certiticate or military 
necessi1:11• Certificates ot militaey necessity would be subject to 
future review by the General Accounting Office ee to all the f£cts set 
forth llitbin such a certificate £or compliance thereto. The necessar.r 
mechanics of such a Board would be so established es to act w1 thin a 
comparatively short time on such request.a for negotiated procurements. 
Small business is being denied 1 ts just share ot the Government• a 
procurement dollar by the increasing use by the Department o£ Defense or 
sole-source negotiations. It it could be possible tor small businessmen 
to be more completely intormed as to the nature of the prcducts that the 
Government ie buying, small business would be able to compete and more 
competition would result in large savings to the Oovermnent as better 
products would be secured. 
There are i tens which tor security reasons should not be advertised 
S2 
and also items of such canplezi ty that !crmal advertisement is unJusti-
!'iedJ however, negotiation 11 being used in tll3D¥ instances where the 
interests ct tlle OovaJ."n'ment could beat be served b7 tcrmal advortiaing. 
Even in these instances of sole-source procurements, the procuring 
agency should be alert to the possibility of having engine~:ring data 
and drawings made available tor the use by the Government. In this way 
many items could subsequentq be made available under advertised pro-
cedures. 
Too mu.ch empbaais is being placed by the Department o£ Defense 
on negotiation with a eole source, because it is the easiest method 
for thG to use. '?hey are not permitting small business to participate 
to the extent it rightru113' should in our defense ef!ort, consequently, 
both the countr;r and the small business cmmunity su!£er from this 
lack of full participation. 
CHAPT.ER VI 
-
SMAU. BVSIHESS PARTICIPATION IN D!FEMSE SUBCONTRACTING 
Bietorical~, the subject of aubccmtracting in militu,y procure-
ment bu been overshadowed by the emphasis placed on the award of prime 
contractors to small busineae tlrma. Congressional intent that. amall 
business receive a fair and just share of defense contracts has alw1111 
been expressed in terms ot prime contracts. However, closely related 
to the procurement program and the share of contracts s.warded to small 
business is the general subject ot subcontracting. 
In times of all-out production such as was experienced in the 
period troa 19"2 through 1945 and the period fl"Oll 19SO to 19531 the sub-
ject ot eubcontl'aotiug does not attract much attention. anious]¥ in 
such times small tirms participate in the production effort with prime 
contracts. Subcontracting opportunities are numerous, and large concerns 
ective]¥ seek out efficient mall producera to uaist in producing 
component parts or suba.saembliea on a subcontract basis. 
However, when military expenditures ere reduced and purchasing 
1a on the decline, this entire picture changes. A chain reaction aeta 
in wich bu a serious impAct on the small tirm. Lesa prime contracts 
ere available eo that competition between small ti.ms ia more eevere, 
and small business must compete with more large firms. At the same time, 
large business, in order to keep plents operating ett1c1ently and 
pqrc>Ua up. will ofter leas and leas aubeontract opportunities. 1h1a, 
in tum, reaulta in a turther reduction in vork available to small 
business concerns. I£ no effort ia made to counter these trenda, mal11' 
emall producers are forced to close their doors. This has the ettect 
or not onq depresaing our eoonC1217 but al.80 of depriving the Ration ot 
an important link in defense production in timea of emergency. 
THE LA.OK 01 AH ADE~ATE GCJVERNM'F.N'l' SUBCCJiTRACT DEFINITICB 
AND THE ME.A.US OF ID:ASUIWIG TRUE SUBCCMTRACT!NG VOLUME 
Adequate proviaiona are not present in the Small Business Act 
to asaure small business or .fair participation in the defense procure-
ment program through subcontracts trom prime contractors. J.s a result, 
armed services procurement agencies are free from strict requirements 
to embed¥ responsibili~ ct the prime contractor in the contract to 
subcontract to small business. Most prime contracts contain a clause 
that the prime contractor must subcontract whatever portion or the 
contract that ie feasible. However, this is a worthless provision and 
generally serves Qnly as a removal of definite requirement !or sub-
contracting. 
From time to time• individual prime contractors publish figures 
on their volume of subcontracting, and theae in tum are reflected in 
sane Government statistics. ibis is what some authorities class as 
•subcontracts" or 11aubcontracting8 • Thia certainl.7 provides the oppor-
tunity tor hocus-pocus in preparing such tigurea. No less than 
Webster•a dictiona:q states, "subcontract ••• c contract by uhich one 
agrees to render services or to provide material.a neceasart for the 
performanee ot another contra~tn .10 The Waleh-Healq Public Contncts 
Act also supports this cmnibus inclusion ot nearl.3' all purchases 1n 
the claes1£ication of tJUbcontncts11• Simi.hrl,y 1 the .. \rmed 8erd.cas 
Prccurement iletiUlatiOt'ls,. Article J-808-S indicates ••• subcontracts mq 
be placed tor work, rav materials, parta and ccaponents. All of this 
means that the actual volume ot true eubcontraots that arc :nadc avail-
able to emal.l buaineas cm defense procurement ie rela.tivel.7 mall. A 
reasonable industry 1ntorpretat1on excludes from true subcontract totale 
all supplJ' items, basic components, raw materials and outside eorvicea 
other than for $Ct.\lal manufacture of euba$eemblios. Direction of prime 
contractors to provide small business with subcontncts on a voluuta17 
baaia can be no more eucoessful than were ell wages and s:.ilariea p~id 
to a !ew thousand select persOllS in this country and tney- were "directed" 
to voluntarill' look after the rest of us. 
THE CASE Fat iXT~I:Ntl PF.ESi.NT SM.ALL BUSINESS a&f·.ASi.DE 
F1lOORAM FCft PRIM& CONTRACTS TO INCWlU:~ SUB-CONTRACTS 
tnl.J' by prtrVisiona in the Small Business Act which will enable 
the Small Business .Administration to insert in suitable defense procurement 
1.0wcbster•a International !!~ctionuz, Second Bdition, Unabridged, 
19S81 P1.ae' 2.$08. A. iierriarn-webster. 
llwalah-Healey Public Contracts Act,. Section 301 Rullnl!:a ~ 
Interpretations Number 2.• 
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prime contracta definite reqairementa that the prime contractor aubeontract 
to small business the tabr1cat1ng ot specific aaeembliea needed tor tul-
.f'illment ot the contract, can mall business be ••sured ot tair partici-
pation 1n the defense program, and their atetua as a national asset, be 
preserved. .Frequentl.T, defense prime contract.a now contain clauses 
requiring that specitic portions of the contract be subcontracted to 
named cmpaniea. However, this procedure is not used to protect a.mall 
business. It is primaril.7 emplOJ'ed to giYe the procuring agency control 
over sources ot supplT for whatever reason IU1' appl,J'. 
The &Qall Business Act alread.Y provides £or set-aside ot pr.ble 
oontraota b7 the Small Business Administration. Thia was aatiafactort 
to all concerned prior to the advent of weapon eyateme procurement. 
Extension ot the set-aside authority and reaponaib1Ut7 ror the Small 
Business Administration to include aasembUes and equipnent within the 
prime contract would be well within the concept originalq created by 
the Small Business Act. '.t'hco.gh the procurement agencies mq find f"ault 
with auch plan, the personnel of t.be Small Business .Administration v.1111 
no doubt, be competent to operate the set-aside ot assemblies and 
equ1p:aent w1 thin t.be prl.me contract, as tb.q have proven eminentl.T 
euccosi\ll in the program ot set-asides tor suitable prime contracts 
prior to the advent ot weapons 97stema procurement. 
Up to th18 time, because of the efforts ot the Small Business 
Adndnistrat1cu, the program o! set-aside• for suitable pr.1.me contra.eta 
has been an expanding cae. For example, in l9SS, '386,610,ss9 was ear-
llal'kld tor amall budneM. In 1962 thia emount wu S.ncreaaed to 
t2,29s,015,ooo. Since the ti.me t.h• agency w•• established in 19531 
Govermcmt procurements valued at apprcximatel,7 nine and tour-tenth• 
billion dol'Ura have been set-aside tor ccapet1t1ve award to small 
bueinesa.12 
OOVEIUtM.niT OfliTROL OVER Tim MAKE m BUI DECISIClf 
Df SUB-Cm.TB.AC!INQ 
S1 
Several year• ego, the Department ot De.tense adopted a 8\lbcantract 
program which, in etf'ect, constituted a request to the major prime 
contractors to adopt voluntaril7 a me8Dingtul. subcontract progr&ll'l 
desiGned to benefit small firms. the program also included the establish-
ment of a reporting procedure to provide atatJ.stic1 on the volume ot 
subcontracting to am.all bwdnesa. In addition, the large prime con-
tractors wen requested to designate a high level officer to act aa 
liaison with amall buaineas concema, olfic1ale ot the prime contractors, 
and the various Government departments. Unfortunately, the canpalll' 
poU.ciea ue of auch a geueral nature that little or no specific 
assietance to small buaineaa is accanpl18hed on a voluntar.y basis. In 
order to be ef!eotive1 the company liaison officer should participate 
in the make w bur decisions of the compan;v prccurement otticer aa tbie 
l2aeport of Hearing Be!ore tJle Select Committee on Small 
Business, United States Senate., Second Seasim1 United States Government Printing Office, 'Washington. September 12, 19o2. 
decision determines whether or not the contractor 11111 pertarm the work 
or whet.her he will subcontract it out, usuall.7 to small CC111pan1e1. Ir 
the lt.aiaoo of.f'icer is not participating in those decisions small bua1.-
u11 baa no representation and, more often than not#, it 18 resolved in 
favor or. the prime contractor. ?he liaison ot'ticer should have sum-
cient authority to influence these dec1.sions in tavar ot small business 
end to prevent wute.rul duplication of small subcontractors• facilltiea 
by needless expansion of the prime contractors• facilities particularl.7 
it financed by the Government. In actual practice such ia not the case. 
Under the weapons syetem concept of procurement, cost-plua 
contracts are usuall.1 avarded a!ter evaluation of all engineering pro-
posel.8 aubmitted. 'lhereatter the make or bU)" decisions most econcaicall.7 
advantageous to the prime contractor are not necessarily most advantageous 
to the Government or to small busineas. It is at t.bia point 1ilhen the 
make or buy decisions of the pri:cl1e cmtraotor are being made that the 
interests ot maall firms are not protected. IJ.'he average ama11 campanJ' 
has uo wq ot finding out what the prime contractor proposes to bU1' and 
thus does not get an opportunit;y to compete. As long as small business 
or th• Government bu no representation in these decisions, the prime 
contracton will continue to subcontract only that portion of arrt con-
tract which expediency and economic advar~tages to the CQJlp&DT dictate. 
O.tticial.9 of the prime contractor, tmbitioua to increase their volume 
and to we a good record, will resolve moat issues in favor of their 
cc:mp&111 and apiuat potential small business subcontractors. The 
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aubcontractora will take the brunt ot 11111' cutback in order 'that the 
prime contractor m.q keep its work force intact in anticipation ot 
future contracts. 'lhe prime contractor can and vill take advantage ot 
the subcontractor's know-hov on the production of components developed 
by' tho aubcontractor. 
A specific case in point was recent]Jr brought to lie;ht by the 
Honorable Abraham Multer, Chai.man of Subcommittee ffumber 2 0£ the 
House Select Camd.ttee on Small Business. Thia is bis statements 
A. subcontractor was selected over two years ago arter can-
peti ti ve bidding aong more than 'kn ccmponent manufacturers to 
build Pl"Ototn>es ot more th.an thirty camponents for a missile. 
This vas for that portion or electronic gear that the prime 
contractor we.a building in their facility. 
!he subcontractor worked :faithtull.T with the prime contractor 
in the research and developnent stages and tooled tor production 
of these parts. The subcontractor waa told to tool and to gear 
up t.or approximately five thousand sets and was led to believe 
they would get these orders which would run for approximately tvo 
years or more. Many boUra were spent on this project by the 
subcontractor's engineers, who WOl'ked closel)r with the prime 
contractor•• engineera perfecting the designs ot these parts. 
Tile pJ."l:ale contractor has juat recent)¥ paid the subcontractor 
tor the tooling which was authorized and which waa canpleted b7 
the subcontractor two years ago. Personnel ot the prime con-
tractor have repeatedl.T shown appreciation for the engineering 
and production services or the subcontractor as well aa the quallt7 
o! their product. 
The subcontractor now learns that the prime contractor has 
elected to bring into their taoill ty production machinery and 
personnel to make these parts themselves, notwithstanding tbe 
.ract that the subcontractor, as low bidder, bu the equipment 
and know-bow geared to run the job. 
AvmA.Gi SHALL BUSIBESS SUBCCB'l'RACTCl\S ARE IDEALU SUITED 
TO llAlfDLI SUBCQiTR!CT Want FCR GOVlilUiMEtlT PRIME Ctm'RAC'l'tnS 
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!be average amal.1 business subcontractor is looking for no 
special favors .trcm the Administration, the Department ot Defense or the 
prime contractora. 'l'hia average subcontractor raaliaee that the weapons 
~management concept. requires the managerial aldll or a large cor-
poration and does not up1re to compete 1n tbie tt.elc:l. However, the 
eld.1.led small bueinen subcontractors with established and acceptable 
QUality control, ehop procedures, end. engineering know-how derived £rem 
19ara of experience and reaearch at their own expense,. believe the7 
should be given an equal opportuni tT to bid on and prov1cle such 1 tema in 
the weapons ayatea concept when thffl can prove they can do the job 
tastei-1 better, and at leaa cost to the Department of Defense. 
'What is perhapa mm more important to the Department ot Defense 
and the mlitU7 budg•t, this small buain••• subcontractor, who usua113' 
tunct1on1 under tixed•price contract., can produce these item.a tor traa 
.fi.t'teen per cent to tort,y per cent lees coat than the prime contractor 
could produce the ••• item. If the Depart;meut ot Defense would require 
that tho large prime weapons concept contractors 8l1bcontract more work 
rather than reducing the amount subcontracted end atop the foolish hiring 
ol nan-essential people just because the pr1me contractor is operating 
under a coat plus type of contract, the mi.Utaq budget could be 1Ub-
etantiall1' reduced. 
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lhe .tollowing i8 a typical example of an eveeydq small business 
aubcontnctol' ccmplaint. It happened to the c. G. Hokanson Canpan;r, Inc., 
ot Los Angeles, Calitomia. Below ia a verbatim report b7 the firm's 
president. 
The example I em about to give aterta with • request for 
quotation received in March 19.$6. 
l. Bequest tor quotation received Maroh 1, 19S6, tor special 
ground-support equipment eirconditioner tor llilitarr aircraft. 
2. About Mach lS, 19S6, our canpanT submitted engineering 
proposal, ccaplete design concept, canptete cost breekdown, and 
fixed·prie• quotaticn. 
J. Alao nbmitted was the approximate deliverr schedule ot 
urgent17 required first unit tor one hundred tvent7 dqs £ran 
date ~ order. 
h. Bot.b ve and the prime contractor knew that the Air Force 
had let a research and development contract in December 195h tor 
the aeme requiremente and a satiatacto17 unit had not aa 79t 
been developed. 
· s. About April 11 1956, our canpatq' was inv.1.ted to discuss 
design concept and teaaibill~ 1d.th prime personnel including 
pu.rchesina1 ground-support equipumt engineering, projects 
engineering people, and aerod1nam1ciata and themod¥nmdciata. 
6. About Mq 11 19561 we received purchase order incorporat-
ing epec1£1cat1on changes we had reccmionded at previous meeting. 
7. · Mq lS, cutaner ands resident aped.it.er to our plant. 
8. Prelimin8%7 testing ot unit 1• ccamenced over Labor Dq 
weekend. 
9. Fi.rat unit wee deliwred to the ouatcmer September 19. 
10. Teats conducted at custcmer '• premises under ambient 
cond1tions 1dentieal vith ambient design conditions ot epecift• 
catiorus tor cooling. 
It ao happend.ed that the temperature ot the dq during 
the teat was uactl1' the temperature required ot the unit, ao 
regular weather conditions were applied rather than using a 
testing laborator;y. 
11. Ouataller' a engineering and project personnel accept unit. 
Testa ahoved unit to have cspaci t7 ot eight to ten per cent 
above nquirements. 
12. Abont Winter 19S7-19S6, nnspapen report prime (our 
customer) ia to receift order for additional planee for Depart-
.ment of De.tense. 
13. Periodic calla to cuatcmer purchasing departanent indi· 
cate that tbe unit for the aubsequent requirements 'ld.11 be 
redesigned and aaaewhat 811apli.t'1ed and that when the epecitica-
tions en cGmpleted we 'Will have the cpportuni ty to bid. 
1.h. About June, Juq, or August 19561 we hear from the aeme 
aupplien who turnished us with materials used, such as aluminum, 
steel, copper, et cetera, and equipment and macbin81"1' suppliers 
that the prime, our custcmer, ia going to build tbe unite in 
their own plant. 
15 • I tmmediatelT check td. th the prble' • purchasing depart-
ment and 1ubsequent'q with other sources within the prime 
compl.'QT 1 end the statement wu ver.tfl.ed that the prime had space 
and manpower not gainful.17 employed at the mment, and so decided 
to aanutscture the air conditioners nth their own personnel. 
16. OU suppliers told us the prime had placed orders tor 
canponenta that would indicate the7 were going to build about 
savenv air conditioners. 
17. fJu.r1ng Cbtober and November 19>8, we heard unwr.Lt'ied 
reports that custmer wae .t'1n1shing or had finished three unite 
that would be used for performance, acceptance, and enviroamental 
testing. Subsequentl.7, further unver:lfied reports were received 
to the effect that the uni ts the oustClller bad designed were not 
performins to apectations. 
ia. Ic rebrual7 19591 we received a request tor quotation 
tor live onl.T air conditioners similar to the eevent,- unite the 
customer was reportedl.7 building in their own plant. The 
Request, for Qtotatiai also called tor full and ccmplete 
HIL-D-S028A drawing• and. complete vitb parts and part• source 
data. 
19. Our compaDJ decided to submit a quotation, complete 
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engineering design concept and all other data requested to be 
submitted with the bid. which bid vas submitted on the date 
due in Much. 
20. However, ve decided, before aubmi tting our proposal, 
to uk the custcner•a purchasing department if there w11a a 
posaibilitq that the number ot unite involved Jdght be in-
creesed. to, eoy seventy total uni.ts. We eX:plained that the 
cost ot tbe first five units would be slightly higher, but 
that the next e1xt7-tive vould be built tor a material labor 
redu.etion because w would make a cmplete set ot pattern.a 
and jigs fJ'Qll'l the original protot1pe1 saving labor apenn 
on .future production unit.. 
21. The answer ve received is shocking. We were told 
that definitely only five units would be purchased. Two 
\Ulita wmild be us•.d to ae~t An emergenay requil'Ement and the 
other three units wculd be used as samples tor the canpanr•a 
production df'partment to CorY in 'building the balan.oe ot 
their requirements. 
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The economic free..,enterprise system that haa produced in thio 
countq the highest standard of living the world has ever know should 
be safeguarded zealous'l1 b7 the lawmakers er.cl law entorc~nt agencies 
o! this Government especiel.17 trcn cases such as the above c. a. Hokm-
aon Oomp1ey .t.tasco. It is true that in the production ot autanobileo, 
refrigerators, et cetera, where the volume or um.ts produced in a Tf!Gr 
will total in tho .millions, there is no plnce tor a:nnll bunnesa for 
obvious reasons. 
It is imperative that large business bo encouraged sud given 
free rein to increase productivity, thereby' reducing the cost ot the 
autc:mobile 1 tor exsmple, which otherwise could not be manufactured. in 
the price range that the average American could afford. American big 
bu~• has certainl.7 aude a mnjor contribution to the hi&h standard 
of living we enj01 in this countt7 todq. 
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But thia baa no bearing ou the subject or production costs in 
the field of military procurement were rare]¥ ia there a requirement 
tor u m8T11' as one thousand units and more trequentlJ' on the average 
order or me hundred units. 
llu the Departmeut ot Defense ever ordered one thousand ot any 
one or the fighter series trOil the r-100 through the r-109? Even if 
one ot these products proved so superior as to call for a requirement 
ot one thousand units, it is doubtful that the design would be permanentl;r 
frozen. It is more than like}3' that man.;r major changes would be orderod. 
during the menu.facture or the thousand uni.ta. 
It is 1n this field or small military purchases that the small 
business job shop type ot operation excels 1n maneuverability-1 adjust-
ing qu:lckl.T to sudden changes in requirements1 operates with much lower 
.fixed le.bor burden and overhead, and 11 usua11¥ ~ specialist in his field, 
being re¢red to engineer and design in order to 'bid on fifty to one 
hundred t1.t't7 different systems a year, whe:ree.e mw eingle engineering 
group within a prime contractor organization. will seldom need to consider 
tbe requirefll8nts of more than two or three d.1!.terent designs a year. 
During the res\ ot the year these engineering groups, employed 
by the prime weapons .,-stem. contractor, ne occupied witb maUT other 
responaibilltiea. 'l'he net result is that this type ot engineer baa 
never bad the time or opportunit.7 to delve deep~ into the latest impran-
unta and acienti!ic advances in &ll1 specialized field, but is quite 
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capable or eYaluatins the comparative excellence or tho enginf!ering pro-
poaals 8\lbmtted bJ' the bidding small business subcontractor. 
THE HEm rm QOVE:RNM!:11T PROCUREMENT AGF..NTS TO DISCOORft.GE 
PRIME CCN'l'RACTCM FRat BI·PAS3ING QJALIJ'IED 
SMALL ausumss SUBCClfTP..ACTORS 
The prime veapons SJ&• contractor shC'Alld not be permitted to 
el1miuate aubcontracting end benoef'orth b\li.ld those products in their 
CWl'l or as 1a trequ.entl,y the case in leased, Gove:rnment-olimed tacillties, 
alld ahelve the experienced technical braina or the small business sub-
contractor. 
1'he be.lie weapons •ntal procurement concept is supported best 
and most econadcall.7 'When pl"OCUl'Emel1t agencies and prime contractora 
make maximum ue ot canponent specialists. Development work require• 
the use ot apeciallata to attain the basic aim ot the weapons qstem 
concept -- the best article in the shortest time for the best price. 
Etficient production requires sld.llful. and intelligent aasembly ot ccm-
poo.ents ecoaomieall.7 produaed. In the initial. developent of a weapon, 
tb.e prime contn.ctor £aces basically an engineering problem. He must 
meet per.t'orman.ce speci.tication1• so he must stipulate basic design 
perimeters end 11atis.facto17 perton:anoe characteriatic1J e t~.sk £or hie 
engineering .torce. 
Engineers are curious and ambiticus. They welcome challenging 
aituatiOWJ. Tbq believe thq can aolve all the problems .facing thta in 
66 
srq development program. 'lhe1 are prone to avoid taming out portions 
oi' their probl.eu. Pride 1mpela them to want to provide the whole 
solution. 
When Govermaent money ia available, nanageiuent bas a natural 
inclination to keop it in the fami'J.1'. This ts part.icularl.3' true lihen 
there ia au opportunity to expand the canpan.r•a product.a. Thws1 menage.. 
ment has a tendency to ignore the poesibilit.ie1 ol e.:nploying provt;:n 
emall business component specialists in the tield. 
Management depends upon i ta engineers tor an evaluation or the 
initial probl•• The usual result ia that the engineers-confident, 
capable, and determined-put the prime contractor in a position of' nega-
tive m.enagement incentive. The engineers f'oraee a large capable organi-
zatioo. Management sees additional profits fram development and manu-
facture ol major components Wile expanding its facilities and capabilities. 
It urges the procuring agencies to bu1' the idea with all ot its persuasive 
power. 
Too trequent]¥ the procuring agents do not recognize the under-
1.y.:1.ng reasons lor the suggested prosraui and proceed to purchase it as 
presented. A f.-equent eupporting argument 1s that a prlJae can be held 
responsible only £or those canponents over which he has 1\lll control and 
i;b4t1 there.tore, on}J" he can sq what he should mske or bUT• !he vriter 
agrees 1 ao long aa the pl"ime om tractor remains cost conscious vi th the 
Goverment•s mone11 however, rejects the premise as invalid when tbe 
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pl'1.me ocntractor ignores the euperior pertomence and lower coat ot 
inclopendent amall · bum.neaa apectalista in order to teether hie own neat. 
SUcb a prcicedure 1a unneceas1r1, vestet\\11 ti.me cClll\U1d.ng1 and contrD.17 
to tbe buio prtnciple ot the weapons sy1Jte concept. 
BECCMMERDAfICBS AIMED AT IMPROVING SMALt BUSINESS 
PAR1'ICIPID<D lN DEJDSI SOBCcm'RACTING 
To protect the interests ot small buainess, a number ot changes 
to the Al'med Semcee Procureaent Regulatione would be recmmended to 
the Department of Defense. The recommended changes listed below would 
be epecificall.7 aimed. towards improving amall bumuHs• participation 1n 
defense aubcontraoting. 
l. Regulatlona now provide t.bat the major pr:t.me contractor 
be urged to develop and eatabUsh a defense aubeontracting small 
busl.nea• program. The establiahment ot cmch a program ehould be 
made mandato17 b7 chans1ng the W01'd tturgedn to «Tequired"• 
a. Under CUJ'l"ent armed services procurement regulat1Clll81 
contracts oonUd.n the following olauaoa •2be cc:ntnctor agrees 
to aocanpllsb the 11uj&U1t amount of euboontraoting to amall busi-
neaa conceme that the contractor finds to be ccnaistent v1 th 
the efficient peri'omanoe ot the contract•. 
This regulation ehould be changed to re~ the maximum 
aaount of subcontracting to small buainesa that the contracting 
otlicer and the contract.or jointls t1n4 to be consistent Vi th 
the eftioient pertormance of tbe contract. 
3. Armed Services Procurement Regulation 1·701.3(11) pro-
v.ldea that tbe prime contractor establiah policies t.o assure · 
that Small Dusineea ooncerne Will have an equitable opportunity 
to cmpete tor subcontracts with particular regard to aoUoifatiooa, 
time tor the preparation ot bids, quantit1ea1 apecit1cat1cos, and 
del1Vl17 aohedulee suitable tor small buaineee part1cipation. 
Thie regulat.100. ebould be chanpd to contain ad.di ticnal pro-
viaiona necessa17 lor an equitable opportunif,J aa follon1 In 
order to assure that small business concerns w1ll have an equit-
able opportunity to cc:apete for subcontracts, all small firms 
requeat.ing permission to bid and llho have not been diaquaU!iect 
through actual 8Ur'fe71 will be granted an opportum. t7. In the 
event the bidder• list is ao large u to preclude utilization 
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ot the entire liatin.g1 the rotation ayatem ld.ll be used in the 
same manner as required under .Armed Servic4ia Procurement Regula-
tions tor Govemment contracting otticersJ also the establishment 
of poliq to asl'llre that small buainesa ooncerna have an equitable 
opportuni t1 to compete, vi th particular regard to time far the 
preparation of bids, quantities, epecitications, and delivery 
schedules, suitable to IUll buaineea part.icipation. 
b. Replationa require aubmiaaion ot information on rozm 
DDl.140 on subcontracting to small buaineaa. This form should 
include the emount ot subcontracting to am.all business b7 con-
tract number, dollar vollUne, and item descriptioa, and aucb 
records on each individual contract be made available upon request 
to milit.ary representatives or the Small Business Administration. 
s. There ahoul.d be the requirement that the small business 
liaison afficel" of the prime contractor participate in this 
capaci'1i7 1n all decisions pertaining to mske or bu7 as well u 
supervise the small business prcgram. or the procurement div.!.sicn 
of hia COIBp&l'J1'• 
6. Provisions ahould be made that before :facilities con-
tracts are awarded either to prime or subcontractors, de.£inite 
evidence be required th.at av.ch £acilitiee are not alreacq in 
eld.etence in small business firms. 
7. The exitrting forms used by the m111 tar,y depn.rtment, 
entitled De.tense SUbcontractip,g Small Business Checklist should 
be complcte'li revised iu a manner that permits ?actual reporting, 
covering all points o£ the defense subcontracting aall buainese 
progr&mJ these reports to be aubmitted through the appropriate 
militar.r department to the Office of tb.e Assistant Secretarr ot 
Detense (Supplt and Logistics) end information fran these reports 
made available tnrougll tbeee acurcea to the Small .i:iusineaa Ad.min· 
istration. 
a. the de.tense subcontracting .small business program should 
include the provision that tbe Small Buainesa Administration mq 
assign on a full or part.time basis a Small Business Administra-
tion representative in appropriate plants of the large prime 
contractor• aa defined in Armed Servicea Procurement. Regulation 
i.101. 
9. Then ahould be a requirement that all potential 
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contractors euhnitting propoeala on procunment anticipated to 
be one million dollars or more subm1 t to the contracting o.ft1cial 
a list of all subcontracts and subcontractors by name, location, 
and eise (large or small) and which subcontracts are anticipated 
to be halt million dollars or more. 
The cop:r of the list as submitted to be transmitted to the 
small business speciaUat, ot the appropriate milituy department 
(Armed Services Procurement Regulation 1·707.4) and the appro-
priate Small .Buainen Administration regional office in the 
geographic area or the prime contrnctor. 
10. 1he Armed Services Procurement fl.egulation now provides 
tha\ consideration ot the extent. of subcontracting mq be a 
£actor in awarding negotiated contracts. This consideration 
should be llmited on}T to subcontracts with small business and 
not be overall 1nclus1 ve as now stated. 
these above recam11endatd.cna ere made tor the purpose ot 
placing the subcontracting program of the major prime contractors 
on a similar basis as now required or the Government's contract-
ing otficera b7 regulations. 
In conclusion, the fol.lowing suggestions and recanmendations are 
made. Weapons, lllatlagement, and Operational system tqpe contracts have 
absorbed prime contract opportunity .tonner}T available to small busi-
ness concerns directlJ .f'rm the Government and should be curtailed or 
administered in such a manner that the equities ot capable small con-
tractors lilill be observed. B7 "curtail" 1 meaning that it should be 
Umited to the specific type of weapon where the;; f\%'8 uaetul, not ex-
plained vtthout logic or without gocd reason to areas where that type 
o£ contracting ie not essential to the best interests of the Government, 
and to the obtaining or the supplies and materials moat etficientlJ end 
at the least possible costs. Some thought ahould be given to amending 
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the Small l.luaineaa Act to include :more specU'ic authority in regard to 
subcontracts i.t the Stull .Buainess Administration or the procurement 
agencies are t,o be held accountable in any vq tor the subcontracting 
of Government work. The problem here 19 that there is no connection 
between the procuring officer or the Small Business Adldnistration and 
the eubcm.tractor unleea 1 t ia med.a specific at the t1rA ot the letting 
ot the contrao\1 or unless by general reeulationa or law in some wq 
there is sane connection. '?he Small Business .Administration should be 
afforded en opportunit..J to dev.elop ema1.l business sources before there 
ie Government approval tor a prime contractor to llCc;uire additional 
tacilitiea at Government expense. It is realized that this ia a broad 
recommendation, and it should be developed elow'b' to be certain that 
there ia not en7 interference with effective and efficient procurement 
processett. 
Laetl.y • necesse.ry legialati ft changes should be made 10 that the 
Anted Sel"Vicee Procurement Regulations would apply to subcontracts as 
well as to pri.lae contracts. 
CHAPTER VII 
-
CCJJCWSICliS 
Defense procurement involves each year· the plecanent ot Ut\Y 
thcuaands oZ contracts covel'ing the suppl¥ ot millions ot total items 
ranging traa o£t the shelf products, weapons, equipment, and supplies 
with wide]¥ VAJ.7ing degrees of standardization, follow-up contracts tor 
the latest weapons just reaching operational use 1 initial producticn 
contracts tor newl.1 developed weapons, which when operational mq make 
obsolescent the current new weapon, and research contracts to develop 
possible weapons to make obsolete ell earlier types. This rate of 
obsolescence may be illustrated in jet aircraft and miss:Lles. Hardly 
a production model aircraft on the buying list for fiscal year 1962 
waa found in the 195S btcyi.ng program. Similarly 1 almost no missiles 
contracted for in 1962 were being produced iu operational quantities in 
th• earlier year.U 
The cd.ze and complexitq ot the defense camnitmente involve 
supplf in .rantutic ccmplicaticm of planning, programming end scheduling. 
llstatement ot w. J. McHe11, Comptroller of the Depart.ment ot 
Defense. Hearings on Janual'J' 1962 Economic report ot the President 
be.tore the Honse end Senate Joint Economic Caamittee, eighv-seventh 
congress, Second Session, Page 317 (1962) 
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Reaoarcee ot •me7 £or supplies and induatr;r cepacif,J' to produce them 
are nece1aar111' lim1 ted. Decislons u to which i tau are to be procured, 
in which quantity, where and whcm-J>rerequisi te to tbe tetting ot cm-
tract~t be long preceded b7 poll07 devisims co future m1Ut117 
taaka Ot the umed services. Rew defense obligations• ch8tlges in long. 
range strategy, annual appropriation levels and tbe ever increasing 
rate of technological dovelopuent each may drastica1)3 alter supporting 
supply patterns. 
Programming £or procurement, then, begins 'With broad decision• 
ot foreign policy and national securi t7 determining basic strategic 
missions for the Arme4 rorcea. 'lbeae deciaiona are then formed into 
more specific supplT programs for each ot the services. Within each 
militar;r department thee• programs are .further researched tor transla-
tion into terms ot apeci.tic need, the stage lib.ere actual procurement 
of specific new items can be requsted.14 
!he contracting otticer• s operating procedures and exercise ot 
discretion are governed by a variet7 of instrnctions trca higher 
authori tJ-th• Armed Sel"'Vioes Procurement Act, which is the baaio 
statutory authori~ on deteue prccurement1 the Armed Services Procure-
ment Regulation isaued bf the Assistant Secretarr or De!enae {Supp'l1' and 
14 See Millett, Government ,2 Public Administration, pages 
316-322 (1959). 
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J,ogiatica)J the regulations of the individual eervicea which interpret 
and app]¥ the Armed Services Procurement Regulation to the conditions 
ot the particular aemceJlS and a var1et7 ol directives and instructions 
issued f'raa time to time which mq alao deal w1 th one or another phase 
of prccurement. 
!he Armed Services Procurement Regulation alone contains approx-
imatel,y eisht hundred poges ot specific and detailed in.tructions to 
contracting offieers1 designed to cover possible contingencies a con-
tracting officer mq !ace and to enumerate £actors he muat consider. 
The7 are constant.~ being revised to meet new situations to change 
policies and/or procedures or to remare tabiguitiea. !he inatructicns 
cover the JUll'Jl' steps in the pl"ocuresnent process, .traa maintenance ol 
bidders' lists, through invitation tor bid or requests for proposals, 
negotiation, contract provieicms, award of contracts and termination 
o! contra.eta, inspection end acceptance ot supplies as well as report-
ing various contn.cting operations. Eft17 effort appears to have been 
made to make the instructions epeci!io. 
fhe procuranent responsibilit.1 devolving upon the contracting 
otticer requires a balancing ot m&DT importan1- tact.ors in each contract. 
In addition to the primarJ' milit81'7 considerations, there are many 
lS.nieae regulations are the A'f'll1 Procurement Procedure, »av 
Procunment Directives, and .Air Force Procurement Instructions. 
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ex:temal ractora 11bich • procurement officer mu.at take into account in 
the letting ot contracts. ~eae include such diverse matters aa aet-
aaidea tor. Rall bu.sine•• or tor labor surplus areas, priorities and 
allocations, adequac7 and availability o£ epecifications, various trans-
portation !actors whieb may a1'tect coats, maintenance of a list of firms 
debarred tran bidding, as well u maintenance of an active bidders• 
list. 
In enacting the Armed Services Procurement Act, Congress incor-
porated a uumber of earlier statutorr exceptions to toma.l.ly advertised 
procurement and extended th• unli'orml.7 to all three mili 't.al7 depart-
ments. These and other cm:eptiona introduced for the ti.rat time, it 
was believed, would add procurement, .f'lexibility in llm.ted situations 
to obtain greater benefit tor the Government. However,, it was still 
contemplated that the great volume of purchases and contracts will be 
made u a result ot advertising !orbida.16 
Subsequent experience, however. bas not. borndl out this anticipa-
tion. In terms ot number ot pr001lranent actions during tiscal year 1962 
tor example less tban tour hundred thousand were formally advertised, 
u against sane six and one-half' million negotiated actions. This 
picture 1e, or course, distorted by the veey large number ot minor 
16seuate Report Number $711 Eightieth Congress• Second Session (1947). 
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purchnu involving not more than two thousand five hundred doll.an each. 
Tb.ere were almost. a1x million ot these minor purchases which are negoti• 
ated to avoid the time and ezpenditure incident to more formal processing. 
Exclusing these and the considerable volume of purchases negotiated ou.t-
side the United States, the ~"Uinder are slight]¥ less than the number 
of advertised contracts, 248,667 to Jhh,210.17 
In terms ot dollar Talue b7 rar the largest volume ot procurement 
aoticna baa been negotiated. Begotiated contra.eta have represented more 
than eighty per cent ot procurement ections each 7ear einee the out.b~eak 
ot the Korean emergency. The canpariaon is shown in Table IV on page 22 • 
.Before World War II, defense needs litre a minor element in the 
GCOUCID1t amounting in 19.39 to slightly over cue billion dollars on a 
gross national product ot aUghtlf more than ninev-one billion dollars. 
The mili tart needs of World War II absorbed a major portion or the 
Ration• a output end the postwar readiness ettort, part1cularl3' since the 
ltorean cOnniet, hes made necess&rJ a relativel.1' high level ot expendi· 
turea. !be Depart.ment ot De.tense, implementing that ettort, was described 
in 19SS bf the Hoover Ccmmiasion aa followsa 
• • • .by •t\Y 7ardstiok ot measurement, the (let1on• s) largest 
organisation. lta expenditures consume one-seventh of our 
national incc:ae •. The Department anploye four million three 
hundred thousand people, which is more than twice the manpower 
for the t-en l.ugt'st. corporations ol the Nation canbined, and is 
17 at.rice ot the Secretaq ot Defense, Department of Dt>.fense Number 
and let Value ot Formal.Jil Advertised and other Mi:lltarr Contract Procurement 
Acii'Oiii, li'isea~ (tA:tober l902'T. 
aevan per cent ot the active national labor force, including 
military personnel •. Its assets, real and peraocal, approxi· 
mate one hundred forty billion dollars, which is equal to the 
value o£ all privately owned lend in the United Ste.tea. Ite 
activities are epnad throughout the .forty-eight states, in 
eixteen thousand cities• and extend abroad to fitty-two other 
countries. 
7p 
From 19$0 to 19621 while the national volume ot business expanded 
eightT•one and five-tenths per cent, Department of Defense e.xpenditurea 
mcpanded tvo hundred .t.l.ttT-eigbt and tour-tenths per cent. Currentl.1', 
Department ot Defense e.xpendi t:.uns anount to about Dine per cent of ov 
gross national product. 
Al'Md service expenditures tor procurement of .1Upplie1 and 
services camprise a large part of n.ch apending. In 1962, tor example, 
aore than twentJ·aix · and tour-tenths billicn dollara wu represented by 
8UCh procurement. Thi• enlargement ot the Defense Department u a source 
of busineae makea i ta contracts a major determinant ot the tunctiming 
ot the econmv. Individual industries are at.teated. :ln vary.t.ng degrees, 
depending in parl upon whether their prodUCta have both military and 
civilian use, or whether their ut.ilit7 i• prl.mari.]T or particular]T 
lid.lit.Arr• It is evident tha' defense spending impact on the milk induetey 
aa a whole ie leaa dramatic than on missile manv.f'acturera. Cbviously 
also• prodUcera d1vers1t1ed in more than one industry will be les1 
attected b7 changing apha1u ot detense prccurement. than those :l.n onl.1' 
one .tield. 
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continue Qnd no reversal or significant modifl.cations are in eight, sub-
contracting will remain foremost among the problems ot the small busineu 
de.tense industr.Y• Thia is not to minimise, ot course, the need ot a more 
active end extensi"f• small buai.neu base 1n the field ot prime contnots. 
1be reason subcontracting mu.at pliq a greater role and receive much more 
attention becomes apparent !ran a review ot the £ollow1.ng present circum-
atanc••· 
1. Several recent l"e}lorta ot the Oamptroller Oenerat 16 estab-
lish the .fact. that inadequate attention to subcontract !)rlcee, as 
eumi:t.ted to the Govemment b.Y the prime cmtraotor, ha• resulted 
in excessive coats ot 1JUUl1' millions ot doll8J"a. Some ot tJiese 
reports allege all the elements ot fraudulent activitT m the 
part ot cert41n pl'1me contractors. 
2. There ia a ditlcrepanc;y between the tJ'pes of contracts 
undervhich prille contractors operate and the tJl)e they urant to 
eubcontnctol"8. lralil.e the major prlme contractors contract with 
the Government on a cost pl\19 a fixed tee or price redetenninable 
basis, the subcontractor often operates under a fixed price con-
tract, wit.h,lesa opportune provisions tor price adjustments. 
3. Of perhaps the greatest. aigni.ticance to the taxpa.rer 1a 
the widespread duplication ot tncilitiea that has been 1n pro-
cess in the plants otm&D1' large detenae prime contractors. 
Having been awsrded all-embr~ systems contracts, the syatene 
contractor 1• deiend.ning more and more that maD7 of the items 
which he torm.er)J" aubcontraoted cen be made more advantageous17 
1n h18 own plant. Thus, tbe idle tacilitio ot former aubcon• 
tract.ore becane increaeing~ unnecessar.v and Ollel'OU8]¥ expenat.w 
to maintain. tither becaus• of increased. overhead rates or 
because the Government. actuall1' bears the expense of turnishing 
prodUCtion lac:ilitiea to tb.e prime contractor, these practices 
made UtlllGCessary additions to tbe overall cost ot defense. 
la. Large weapon qatem contractors have too otten exercised 
undue autonCXQ' in arriv.l.ns at. make or blV decildODS. While it 
16.aeporta ot United States Comptroller General to the Congress 
ot the United statesa lumbers B-116693. s.132936, B-U29h2, B-13299.$, 
and s-133122. 1962. 
18 telt that induatr;r moat not be restrained trca ex.eroieing 
their particular expertness in producing defense 1 tents. Thie 
end-product l'88ponaib111ty doea not preclude proper attentiai 
to goveramental policies of ua1.at1ng small business snd main-
taining additional ccapetent and econaaical sourcea. Further-
more, corporate eelf-interest appears the inevitable antithesis 
to subccntracting in JB.af1¥ instances. Adoption ot the weepon 
s;yatem procedure ehwld not mean abandonment of qualified small 
business SOUl"Oea that Jeigbt well have been emplo,red vere 
Govemment-turnished equipment the order or the dq. 
5. The declared small business policy of the Congress is 
not being adequ.ately' implemented bl pruen't procurement regula• 
ticms. The A.med Services Procurmaemt Regulations subcontract-
ing provisions tail to insure to small business a teir 
proportion of de.f'enae aubcontracta. The Armed Senices 
Procurement Replationa provisions in Sections 1·707.3 and 
7-104.lb have not proven sufficient. The Congrese has, bereto-
lore, hesitated to dd'ine more apecii'icall.7 what a "fair 
proportion• of detense contracts should be. It has, however, 
repeatedl7 stated that small business ie not receiving the 
proportion of de!enae contracts that it should. The Defense 
Departaent, on the other hand, hu implied that it teele the 
present amount golng to small fi.l'u 1• adequate. 
uaa~DATI<JIS 
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Armed Services Procurement Regulations should be mod1t1ed to take 
a .timer poaition vitb nspect·to eubcontracting requirements, particu-
larlJ" in light ot weapon qstea buy.tng. Reports turnished by the parti-
c1pat1n~ contractors should emanate traa the purchasing otticea of the 
corporation, rather than the disbursing otticee. The make-or-lnq 
atructure .t'urniehed at the time of contract negotiations should be aa 
Arm as circumstances will pendt1 and subsequent changes therein should 
be made onl,r upon approval by tbe Goverament. Decisions to make component 
dld other items 1nplant that were tormerq subcontracted ehwld be aare-
tully acrutiuised by the procuring activit¥. Special attention should 
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be given to prch1bit1ng1 except in the rarest ot cases, pr.I.me contraoton 
t:raD making an item after having solicited subcantractor proposals. 
Compliance with the Department of Defense subcontracting program should 
be mandatol)' • 
Weapon s.rstm contracting., in the absence Of .nm subcontracting 
laws and regulations, will continue to contribute to an unhealthy ccn-
centration in the defense indua'tr.r. The present trend tovard concentrra-
tion is a natural conccni tant ot the move awq .t'rm direct Government 
purchasing into tbe qatems method, without adequate safeguards for 
potential subcontractors. 
The degree ot this concentration is mirrored. b;y the fact that 
a hmc:ltU1 ot tvenv canpaniea received fifty-one and two-tent.ha per cent 
ot the twenv-atx and one-halt billion dollsz'a spent tor defense prime 
contracts during fiscal 78ar 1962. Almost ten per cent was awarded to 
one cc.npaq. i'he tact that so tev caupenies account tor the majcr1t7 of 
all defense prime contract dollars (the top one hundred caapeiiies 
received aevent.r-aix and four-tenths per cent in t1acal 1'•ar 19621 
cmpared to seventy-five and. tbree-tentba per cent. in the preceding 
19ar) 18 brought into perspective when it ie considered that almost 
three hundred canpeniea have prime contracts with the Department ot 
De.tense tor more then one millian doll.era and repori under the small 
busineaa subcontracting program. '!his ia not to mentiOl'l the thousand.a 
o! other datense auppliera. 
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Under weapon qstem procurement, furthermore, large detenae 
prime contractors have been delegated the responsibility tor awarding 
billione of dollars 1n detene subcontracta. 'lhia autho:ritr has been 
granted up to the present time with little legislative supervision and 
with inadequate surveillonce by the militaey services. The resulta 
have been a virtual elim1nation ot mall business tr01ll the role ot 
prime contraotor1 together with a continuing reduction in aubcontraot-
ing opportunities tor theae .firms. In 'Vin of these conaiderations, 
tbe weapon qatera procurement should be modU'ied, wherever possible, 
to allow for direct procurement o£ auba79tema. Potential small businese 
l'Ubcontra.ctora should be safeguarded by timer laWI and regulations. 
Major items, aub-aseembliea, cc:aponenta and other part of the system 
contract should be ocnpeti ti velJr p:rccured at the earlieat po881ble 
In order to better eccompUeb the objectives recamaended in the 
.foregoing paragraph, a Breakout Comnittee should be established in 
conncctiai w1 th everr 87atems contract. !he Camd ttee would be canposed 
o! repl'\laentativea of the prime contractor, the procurement activit7 
and the Small Buaines111 .Administration. !he duties o.t web camnittee 
would prJJurilT be d tollowa1 
1. Survey tb.e qatm conetf!ntl.7 and recamaend that can-
pcments and other part. be cmpetiUveq procured. at the earliest 
poaaible date. 
2. Make detlnite provision that before taciU tiea contracts 
are awarded either to prime or subcontmctora, delinit.e evidence 
ia obtained indicating that IUCh .l'acilitie• are not already in 
exiatance in emall budneu firms. 
3 • Assure that small busineaa concerns have an equitable 
opportun.:Lt7 to canpete in the syatems contract, with particular 
regard to time £or the preparation ot bide, q.umtit1e1, speci-
ficationa1 and delive17 achedulea, Gitable to small business 
partic1pat1oo.. 
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The nature of modem weapoue and their importance to the national 
aecurit,y of our nation makes the econamica oZ weapons dewlop;uent and 
procurement• prllu.rJ national issue. Aa we push upon the ecieutitic, 
technical, and fabricating atatea-ot-the arts, it 'beocnes both more 
ditficult and more expensive to meet the rf.quirementa tor defending the 
country. !Wen when the amall .firm, either b7 ita own efforts az- b.1 
enterl:ng into a cmbination nth others, ia able to meet the dU'ticulties 
just discussed, it still rans an extraordinarr risk resulting from oor 
atart-and-atop1 atop-and-start policy on militU'J' expenditures. This ie 
a political matter which neither the .Executive nor the Congress hu 
given srq 1ncl1cat1oo ot an abilitq or willingness to solve. It the 
tederal government nre to set up a long rqe program tor procurement 
ct mil1ta17 end products, then emall business might be able to find a 
better wq to get into the business. That means projections beyond 
the two and three 7ean that we nov make. Perhaps moat important~ 
all, it would require tbat we recognize the ccntinuit7 of the prepared-
ness effort and eatablisb a minimum procurement level tor aanething 
like the next ten 19ua. It that were done, there would be a stabilit7 
in the weapons business that would facilitate the appropriate canmercial 
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planning, and 1n such a situation, amall buaineaa should more read113" 
be able to get their lair share of government procurement. 
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